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ABSTRACT 
Both males and females were actively involved in the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE.)  
The thesis analyses whether males and females joined the LTTE for different reasons. The 
methodology used examines statements from interviews conducted by various journalists and 
academics that contain references to security and identity, themes central to the conflict, to 
determine its conclusions. In addition, this thesis uses reports conducted by NGOs, interviews 
with the civilian population, and academic research. The thesis finds that males and females had 
different reasons for joining the organization. However, these motivations are surprising and call 
into question some traditional assumptions of how men and women (should) behave. 
When females joined after the 1983 Black July riots, a massacre that left approximately 
400-3000 Tamils dead, they did so at a time of heightened physical risk for the Tamil minority. 
Female LTTE members joined because of increased risks to bodily integrity, the experience of 
being displaced due to war, and after witnessing the effects of violence on their communities. 
Unlike men, however, women were less likely to speak of their own encounters with the Sri 
Lankan Defence Forces. Instead, females cited the experiences of their families and ethno-
cultural community. Female recruits believed in the LTTE’s definition of gender equality, one 
which constructed female emancipation as the right to engage in combat. Many recruits felt 
stifled by Tamil society, but they also needed an avenue to defend their people once non-violent 
protest became ineffective and their ethno-cultural identity became targeted for oppression 
When males first joined the LTTE in 1972-1976, they did so because their access to 
education and employment was compromised. Until 1983 the LTTE violently protested against 
what they viewed as unjust educational and language policies directed towards Tamils. These 
educational and language policies prevented males from securing stable employment and post-
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secondary education. In the beginning, men conceptualized security as the ability to secure a 
livelihood, but in response to male militancy the Sri Lankan government responded with military 
force. As the conflict grew the number of male casualties increased. In an attempt to seek 
protection from physical harm, males joined the LTTE, an organization they believed would 
grant them physical security. They relayed to interviewers stories of personal injustices 
committed by government security forces. Instead of describing the conflict using a gendered 
framework, male LTTE members believed that the lack of economic opportunity and the 
increased risk of bodily harm, which included death, detention, and torture, were the 
consequences of their marginalized ethno-cultural identity.  
  Though males and females joined the LTTE for different reasons, with females believing 
that gender equality and physical safety were paramount (freedom from fear) and males first 
joining because they needed access to education and employment to survive (freedom from 
want), both sexes were led to the LTTE because of Sri Lanka’s institutional decay. LTTE 
members believed that the Sri Lankan government protected the Sinhalese at the expense of the 
Tamil population.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
This thesis explores why men and women joined the Liberation Tigers for Tamil Eelam (LTTE) 
and whether they did so for different reasons. The historical context for the study is the period of 
the Sri Lankan ethnic conflict that occurs from 1976 to 2009. The conflict has been well 
documented by a number of prominent Sri Lankan scholars. The thesis is situated in wider 
discussions that focus on gender and militancy. It does not assume that men are the rightful 
bearers of political violence; nor does it deem female violent participation as abnormal.  Both 
men and women have spoken of their reasons for joining the LTTE, and comparing these 
statements allows us to assess whether certain reasons for engaging in political violence were 
specific to males or females. The thesis finds that, for males and females in the LTTE, there were 
indeed gender and sex-specific motivations for joining the organization. However, these 
motivations are surprising and call into question some traditional assumptions of how men and 
women (should) behave. Female LTTE members joined because of increased risks to bodily 
integrity, the experience of being displaced due to war, and after witnessing the effects of 
violence on their communities. Female recruits liked the LTTE’s definition of gender equality, 
one which constructed female emancipation as the right to engage in combat. Many female 
recruits felt stifled by Tamil society, but they also needed an avenue to defend their people once 
non-violent protest became ineffective and their ethno-cultural identity became targeted for 
oppression. When males first joined the LTTE in 1974-1976, they did so because their access to 
education and employment was compromised. These educational and language policies 
prevented males from securing stable employment and post-secondary education. In the 
beginning, men conceptualized security as the ability to secure a livelihood, but in response to 
male militancy the Sri Lankan government responded with military force. Since males formed a 
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large portion of these civilian casualties, male participants expanded their conceptualization of 
security to include the absence of physical harm.  Males believed that they were targeted by the 
Sri Lankan government because of their marginalized ethno-cultural identity. Though males and 
females joined the LTTE for different reasons, with females believing that gender equality and 
physical safety were paramount (freedom from fear) and males first joining because they needed 
access to education and employment to survive (freedom from want), both sexes were led to the 
LTTE because of Sri Lanka’s institutional decay. 
The LTTE has been described by some analysts
1
, in addition to being an ethno-nationalist 
group, as Marxist-Leninist in ideological orientation. This possibility was considered seriously 
throughout the data collection process and merits comment. The literature reviewed does not 
indicate that a significant number of LTTE recruits found Marxism-Leninism appealing, even if 
certain key prominent members were explicitly committed to the political ideology. Vellupillai 
Prabhakaran, the leader of the LTTE, admired notable revolutionary socialists like Che Guevera 
and Sumara Bose. Prabhakaran has argued that Tamil Eelam should be a socialist state and that 
“there will be only one party supported by the people...In a socialist constitution the needs of the 
people will have priority.”2 
Stephen Hopgood describes the characterization of the LTTE as Marxist-Leninist 
organization as an “overstatement.”3 The research for this thesis supports that conclusion. While 
high profile members of the LTTE spoke hopefully of socialism, interviews indicate that neither 
females nor males used Marxism to justify their participation. The Sri Lankan government 
                                                 
1
 DeVotta, Neil, Blowback: Linguistic Nationalism (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2004), 327. 
 
2
 M. Narayan Swam, Inside an Elusive Mind: Prabhakaran (Colombo: Vijitha Yappa Publications, 2004), p. 11. 
 
3
 Stephen Hopgood, “Tamil Tigers, 1987—2002,” in Making Sense of Suicide Bombing ed. D. Gambetta, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2005), 48. 
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labelled the LTTE as Marxists and leftists. But this label ignores the complexity of the LTTE’s 
organizational makeup, the fact that there were many non-Marxist elements in the LTTE’s 
leadership, and the presence of even more non-Marxist elements amongst lower-ranking 
combatants.
4
 The LTTE espoused a Marxist ideology when it was useful, a practical tactic 
considering that much of the organization’s existence occurred during the Cold War. The LTTE 
used Marxist imagery to obtain money and arms from India and high profile Indian supporters. 
The LTTE argued that, as both the LTTE and India were ideologically aligned as socialists, 
sympathy with the militant organization instead of the Sri Lankan government (considered pro-
American) would be more beneficial to India’s interests. India, a regional hegemon, took interest 
in influencing Sri Lankan affairs.
5
 
There is little doubt that the LTTE leadership contained Marxists. However, as Ravi 
Vaitheespara once said: “Sincerely as it is peddled, [socialism] is at best a thin veneer over a 
profoundly indigenous nationalist movement…”6 Unlike other Tamil militant groups, the LTTE 
did not employ Marxism as a recruitment method. When large groups of male youth began 
enrolling in Tamil militant organizations, they were, as one observer described, “demanding 
automatic rifles, not lessons in Marxism.”7 Militant organizations that were strongly Marxist 
were eventually destroyed by the LTTE in its quest for dominance. However, the few surviving 
groups realized that indoctrinating new recruits to political ideology was ineffective and 
counterproductive. Indeed, one militant recruiter stated that the influx of youth after the 1983 
                                                 
4
 Neil DeVotta, Blowback: Linguistic Nationalism (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2004), 327. 
 
5
 E Nissan and RL Stirrat, “The Generation of Communal Identities,” in Sri Lanka: History and Roots of Conflict, 
35. 
 
6
 Ravi Vaitheespara, “Beyond ‘Benign’ and ‘Fascist’ Nationalisms,” Journal of South Asian Studies 29 (2006): 3. 
 
7
M. R. Narayan Swamy, Tigers of Lanka: From Boys to Guerillas (New Delhi: Knorak Publishers, 1994), 105. 
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riots destroyed their “desire to train boys politically”8 and that many of the recruits threatened to 
leave the organization if they spoke of revolutionary socialism.
9
 
The possibility remains that there may have been some males and females who joined the 
LTTE because they were attracted to its Marxist-Leninist ideology; however, the thesis 
demonstrates that socialist ideology did not feature prominently in the organization’s recruitment 
process. Further evidence would be needed to make a persuasive counter-argument. Instead, the 
goal of this thesis is to conduct an in-depth exploration on whether males and females joined the 
LTTE for different reasons. 
A History of Sri Lanka’s Ethnic Conflict 
Sri Lanka has a population of approximately 21 million people.
10
 Though there has been no 
census conducted since 1983, estimates indicate that approximately 74.6 percent of Sri Lankan 
inhabitants are Sinhalese.
11
 The Sinhalese are mainly Buddhist, but include a sizable Christian 
minority. Sri Lankan Tamils comprise approximately 20 percent of the country’s population and 
they are Sri Lanka’s largest minority.12 Most Tamils are Hindus, Christians or Muslims. (The 
Muslims consider themselves a distinct minority, though they share a common language with 
other Tamils.)  
 Sri Lanka has a long colonial history and has been colonized at different times by the 
Portuguese, Dutch and British.  As with many of its colonial “assets,” Britain granted Sri Lanka 
independence shortly after the Second World War, in February of 1948.  The transfer of 
governance further complicated ethnic tensions between the Sinhalese and Tamils, already 
                                                 
8
 Ibid,106. 
 
9
 Ibid. 
10
 Miranda Alison, “Cogs in the Wheel? Women in the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam,” Civil Wars 6 (2003): 4 
 
11
 Ibid.  
 
12
 K. M. De Silva, A History of Sri Lanka (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981), 25. 
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evident prior to and during colonization. Sri Lankan political parties have usually been divided 
along ethnic lines, with Tamil elites largely holding political power prior to independence and 
Sinhalese parties dominating the political process post-independence.
13
 British colonization in 
Sri Lanka saw the Tamil minority and certain high-caste Sinhalese elevated to positions of power 
within government and other important institutions, although Tamils only accounted for 
approximately 20 percent of the population.
14
  
 For many Sinhalese, national independence simply meant that the British would be 
replaced by elite British-educated Tamils, who were more westernized, English-speaking, and 
urban than the rural Sinhala-speaking doctors, monks and students.
15
 These rural Sinhalese were 
elites in their own right and respected by their own communities, but did not usually occupy 
government positions. Sinhala Buddhist nationalism appealed strongly to them. In 1956 a 
coalition government called “The People’s United Front” was formed by mobilizing rural 
Sinhala elites. Communal identity became integral to the success of the coalition’s political 
campaign and it won by promising the adoption of a Sinhala-only official language policy and 
that Buddhism would be returned to its rightful dominant position in Sri Lanka.
16
  
 Shortly after the government declared Sinhala as the sole official language of Sri Lanka, 
one of the Tamil political parties organized a non-violent protest outside of the parliament in 
Colombo, the capital of Sri Lanka. There were violent clashes between Tamils and Sinhala-
Buddhists. This clash took place in 1956. In 1958, another clash occurred, also perpetuated by 
                                                 
13
 Swamy, Inside an Elusive Mind, 15. 
 
14
 Kristen Stokke, “Building the Tamil Eelam State: Emerging State Institutions and Forms  
of Governance in LTTE Controlled Areas in Sri Lanka,” Third World Quarterly 27 (2006): 6. 
 
15R.A Gunawardana, “The People of the Lion: the Sinhala Identity and Ideology in History and Historiography,” in 
Sri Lanka: History and the Roots of Conflict ed. Jonathan Spencer (London: Routledge,1990), 35. 
 
16
 Ibid. 
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unfavourable language policies towards the Tamils.  Tamils refused en masse to include the 
“Sri” (of Sri Lanka) on their vehicle license plates. Sinhala activists retaliated by defacing Tamil 
language signs in Sinhala-dominated areas. The conflict escalated when a train carrying Tamils 
was ambushed and the passengers beaten. Consequently, Sinhala villagers attacked local Tamil 
shopkeepers and the rioting spread to Colombo and other urban areas where Tamils were the 
minority. Approximately 400 people were killed and 12,000 displaced. Most of these people 
were Tamil.
17
  
Further grievances included policies, crafted shortly after independence, that saw Tamils 
issued birth certificates, government documents, and land titles in a language most of them could 
not understand (Sinhala). All government communications within universities were exclusively 
in Sinhala.
18
  Limiting university attendance to Sinhalese people affected the Tamil minority 
severely.  Traditionally, education has been culturally important to the Tamil minority, and 
because Christian missionaries in Jaffna (the Tamil-dominated capital city of Sri Lanka’s 
Northern Province) constructed schools in areas that were heavily populated by the Tamil 
minority, many teachers were Tamil, and Tamil students always comprised a high proportion of 
the university population. 
19
 To rectify Tamil over-representation in universities, and as a way to 
resolve the imbalances between various districts and the rural-urban divide, a government policy 
called “standardization” was implemented in 1973. Under the new policy, Tamil students were 
required to score higher than prospective Sinhalese students to gain admission into science, 
engineering and medical faculties. In Jaffna, tens of thousands of young Tamils protested in the 
                                                 
17
 Ibid, 36. 
 
18
 Swamy, Inside an Elusive Mind: Prabhakaran,15. 
 
19
 Ibid. 
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streets against the standardization policy. They scrawled anti-government slogans on building 
walls. In many places government property was attacked and burned. Some Tamils began 
advocating secession from Sri Lanka.
20
 Tamil nationalists fought for their rights in a Sinhala-
dominated parliament. The transition from peaceful parliamentary activity to advocating 
violence by Tamil Eelam was the consequence of government policies that accentuated ethnic 
polarities on the Island. Sri Lanka has been described as a democracy that has avoided ethnic 
compromise with its minorities.
21
 In addition to periodic violent ethnic skirmishes (that usually 
occurred at protests by rogue civilians) and the resistance to acknowledging Tamil as an official 
language equal to Sinhala, one of the earliest government policies to enrage Tamil nationalists 
was “colonization.” In practice, colonization entailed resettling Sinhalese families in territory 
where Tamils formed the majority of the population. According to Tamil nationalists, this policy 
was enacted for two reasons: first, to dilute Tamil power in electoral politics, and second, to 
erode the persuasiveness of the claim that Tamils occupied a distinct geographic territory and 
were therefore a nation.
22
    
 In 1972, small groups of Tamil militants, commonly referred to as the “Tigers” began 
appearing in northern Sri Lanka.
23
 They focused their attacks on representatives of the state and 
on Tamils thought to be collaborating with the state. In response, the Sri Lankan government 
moved large groups of troops and police into the northern part of the country, an area heavily 
populated by the Tamil minority, and introduced the “Prevention of Terrorism Act.”24  
                                                 
20
 Ibid, 18. 
 
21
 Neil DeVotta, “Control Democracy.” 
22
 Ibid. 
23
 “Tigers” is a reference to multiple Tamil militant groups, not a reference to the LTTE.  
24
 Gunawardana,“The People of the Lion,” 37. 
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 In 1981 large numbers of Sinhala police were moved to Jaffna to supervise local 
government elections. After a shooting incident, the police went on a rampage, setting fires, 
looting and killing. The Jaffna Library, the second largest library in Sri Lanka and the main 
library for Tamil material in the country, was burned to the ground. Its destruction was seen as a 
deliberate attack on Tamil learning.
25
 Compared to previous riots in the 1950s that centred on 
Tamil language and learning and involved civilian on civilian violence, this phase of the conflict 
saw Sri Lankan state forces attacking Tamil civilians. By 1983, the army was allowed to shoot, 
kill and bury civilians without requesting an inquest, although this power was later withdrawn. 
26
 
 The emergence of the LTTE is an important part of Sri Lanka’s turbulent history of 
ethnic tensions.  Prior to its defeat in 2009, the LTTE was an ethno-nationalist separatist group 
located mostly in northern and eastern Sri Lanka. The organization fought for a separate 
homeland called Tamil Eelam, a home for the ethnic Tamil minority that historically populated 
the northern and eastern regions in Sri Lanka. For close to three decades, the LTTE resorted to 
armed struggle in an attempt to establish self-government. Though the LTTE waged many 
successful battles, its dissolution was announced and conceded to by its leadership in May 2009 
after a prolonged military campaign against the Sri Lankan Defence Forces (SLDF). 
Standardization caused much Tamil anger and resulted in the formation of many Tamil 
militant organizations.
27
 One of these organizations was the Tamil New Tigers (TNT). The 
LTTE were the successors of the TNT, an organization that Vellupillai Prabhakaran formed in 
1972 when he was 17 years old. The TNT gained notoriety when, in 1975, Prabhakaran and three 
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 Ibid, 38. 
 
26
 Ibid, 37. 
 
27
 Stokke, “Building the Tamil Eelam State.” 
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associates assassinated the mayor of Jaffna. This was a city that the LTTE would later control for 
much of its existence and where Prabhakaran would remain the leader of the LTTE until his 
death in May 2009.  
By 1976, the TNT had become the LTTE. The organization enraged the Sinhala majority 
when, in 1983, it carried out an attack and killed 13 Sri Lankan soldiers. According to the LTTE, 
this attack was conducted in retaliation for the rape of some schoolgirls by these soldiers.
28
 The 
Tamil minority call the Sinhala reaction to this event “Black July.” In July of 1983 government 
supported mobs killed an estimated 400-3000 Tamils and destroyed tens of thousands of 
houses.
29
 
Black July, considered the official start date of the Sri Lanka/LTTE war, polarized both 
ethnicities by destroying inter-cultural ties and any leadership positions Tamils held in Sinhala 
dominated areas. Nationalist sentiments among the Sinhalese were low prior to the massacre, but 
their ethnic and cultural identities grew after the event.
30
 Tamil survivors living in Sinhala-
majority neighbourhoods reported that prior to the event their Sinhala neighbours were 
courteous, but that after the massacre they became fearful, remained indoors and were prevented 
from forming cross-ethnic relationships because Sinhala police encouraged civilians to report 
suspicious Tamil activity.
31
  (Many Tamils were reported for engaging in mundane everyday 
tasks.)
32
 Pre-1983, Tamils had been successful traders and industrialists, catapulting them into 
                                                 
28
 De Silva, A History of Sri Lanka, 12. 
 
29
 A compilation of sources provides different numbers.  
 
30
 Brenner, Francesca, “Fragments of Memory, Processes of State: Ethnic Violence through the life Histories of 
Participants,” in Economy, Culture, and Sri Lanka, ed. Deborah Winslow et al. (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 2004), 137. 
31
 Ibid. 
32
 Ibid. 
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the middle and upper classes of Colombo families. “Two weeks prior to the riots, Tamils 
controlled 60 percent of wholesale trade and 80 percent of retail trade in the capital. After the 
riots the trade was nearly eradicated.” 33 The material conditions that secured their affluent 
positions and allowed them to integrate culturally in Sinhala-dominated communities
34
 were 
gone.  
Before the 1983 riots, Tamil nationalists mostly criticized poor government policy that 
exacerbated ethnic tensions. Territory that was once historically dominated by the Tamil 
minority was being colonized, and language and citizenship rights were being eroded. Tamil 
ethno-cultural identity was being compromised and militants trying to attain these rights were 
facing violent opposition. Nationalists worked to ensure that the Tamil minority had sufficient 
economic, employment, and educational opportunities, and cast doubts on whether the state 
could provide human security to its largest minority. Sri Lankan government transgressions 
increased militant activity. The military response to these transgressions created physical 
insecurity for the Tamil civilian population. Tamil political parties used these reasons to justify a 
sovereign Tamil homeland. Black July became a successful recruitment tool for the LTTE, as 
many Tamils flocked to militant organizations shortly after the incident. Many of those who 
asked for admission into these organizations were women. At the height of the LTTE’s power, 
approximately 30% of its membership was female.
35
   
                                                 
33
 The Economist, “Sri Lanka Puts Torch to its Future,” August 20, 1983.  
34
 The term “community” in this thesis refers to primordial ties characterized by shared ethnicity. 
35
 Hassan, S. Azmat, Countering Violent Extremism: The Fate of the Tamil Tigers (New York: EastWest institute, 
2009.)  
 
 
11 
 
A series of military victories in the 1990s brought certain areas, especially in the north, 
under LTTE control. During this period there was military parity between the Sri Lankan 
government and the LTTE. From 1990-1995, the LTTE created administrative institutions in the 
territory under its control, and consequently Sri Lanka began to appear as two states confined by 
one internationally recognized border. Despite LTTE control of this territory, official Sri Lankan 
government institutions and officials continued to work in LTTE-controlled areas. Therefore 
there was also a dual state structure that developed within areas controlled by the LTTE. 
Travelling from a government-controlled area to an LTTE-controlled area resembled crossing 
the border between two states: travellers were required to show identity cards, have their goods 
inspected, and pay tariffs. The LTTE aspired to be not only a militant organization but a 
legitimate government by establishing judiciaries, economic development initiatives, and police 
services. Solidifying its role as a legitimate governing body, the LTTE also participated as a 
formal negotiating partner with the Sri Lankan government. From 1983 to 2002, five cease-fire 
agreements were negotiated by the two parties.  
 By 1985, the ethnic conflict was causing regional concerns.  India sponsored a peace 
conference in Bhutan where both the Sri Lankan government and several militant Tamil groups 
(along with Tamil political parties) met to discuss the heightening ethnic conflict.  At this 
conference, the militant Tamil groups provided the Sri Lankan government with a short list of 
demands and requests, which included acknowledging the right to self-determination and 
promising to maintain the integrity of traditional Tamil territory.  Even during these negotiations, 
military action continued and hundreds of civilian lives were lost.
36
   
                                                 
36
 De Silva, A History of Sri Lanka, 14. 
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In the circumstances of the Sri Lankan civil war, many young men and women chose to 
join the LTTE:  
Although there are exceptions, the bulk of…terrorist members are not typically part-
timers or mercenaries. In general, the ability to commit otherwise unspeakable acts—
not to mention giving one’s own life—necessitates an unshakable belief that these acts 
are somehow in the cause of some absolute and worthy purpose.
37
  
 
The thesis explores why Tamil males and females joined the LTTE. Did males and females join 
the LTTE for different reasons, and did they conceptualize their involvement differently? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
37
 Laurence Miller, “The Terrorist Mind,” International Journal of Offender Therapy 50 (2005): 2.  
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CHAPTER 2: METHODOLOGY 
The research methodology employed in the thesis involves examining verbal justifications made 
by ex-combatants, the scholarly literature that covers related subjects, and reports by NGOs and 
advocacy groups.  
 The analysis of male and female involvement in the LTTE is situated within a wider 
discussion of why people join militant organizations. Research that focuses on violent women 
often takes one of two forms. The first form characterizes female involvement in political 
violence as unusual. In a study of Palestinian suicide bombers, for example, Terri Toles Patkin 
found that western media coverage tried to search actively for alternate explanations for female 
participation in militancy.
38
 In cross-cultural research on female militancy, researchers Laura 
Sjoberg and Caron Gentry found similarities in how violent women were analyzed. They 
maintain that women, like men, can use violence out of desperation or because they find violence 
useful to fulfill “some other socio-economic motivation.”39 Prevailing academic literature and 
media accounts, they argue, have ignored possible explanations that shift the focus away from 
female victimization. “[W]omen who commit violence have been characterized as anything but 
regular criminals or regular soldiers or regular terrorists; they are captured in storied fantasies 
which deny women’s agency and reify gender stereotypes and subordination.”40Following this 
trend, the Sri Lankan government portrayed female LTTE members as victims and coerced 
participants.
41
 
                                                 
38Terri Toles Patkin, “Explosive Baggage: Female Palestinian Suicide Bombers and the Rhetoric of Emotion,” 
Women and Language 27 (2004):1. 
39
 Laura Sjoberg and Caron E. Gentry, Mothers, Monsters, Whores: Women’s Violence in Global Politics (New 
York: Zed Books, 2007), 4. 
 
40
 Ibid, 4-5. 
41
 The Government of Sri Lanka, “Civil Military Coordination Jaffna,”  http://www.cimicjaffna.lk/main.php. 
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A second body of research has been conducted by international relations scholars who 
have sought to provide alternative accounts to the literature that paints violent women as 
unstable. (Some of these scholars self-identify as feminists
42
.) Scholars such as Miranda Alison, 
Margaret Trawick, and Peter Schalk have extensively interviewed LTTE females and have spent 
time in LTTE-dominated areas. Their work chronicles the lives of militant females, and their 
methodology consists of asking questions of these participants. The responses they received were 
taken at face value and were not viewed as less credible because the female interviewees were 
engaged with political violence, traditionally seen as an un-female pursuit. The outcomes of 
these interviews are often different from scholars who write about violent women as fascinating 
anomalies. Miranda Alison determined that women joined the LTTE for a number of reasons, 
including the loss of a family member, anger towards SLDF atrocities, and fear of sexual assault. 
Margaret Trawick details the daily lives of Tamil youth in her ethnographic accounts and 
illustrates the profound ramifications to the way people think when they live in war zones. Peter 
Schalk writes about the LTTE’s gender ideology and how its “martial feminism” was appealing 
to Tamil females. In general, interviews and reports that allow women to explain their own 
involvement highlight a variety of reasons why women may choose to engage in violence. Often 
their decisions are influenced by geographical and socio-economic contexts. These reasons, in 
the cases of voluntary recruitment, do not show militant females to be confused victims; the 
majority of interviewees explained their violent involvement by giving articulate explanations.   
 The literature that compares male to female reasons for engaging in political violence is 
sparse. The lack of critical study is unfortunate because without analyzing the reasons men 
engage in violence, it is difficult to describe female participation in violence as unique. To 
                                                 
42
 These feminists include prominent academics like Laura Sjoberg, Caron E. Gentry, Miranda Alison, and Cynthia 
Enloe. 
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describe female political violence as unique is to say that women engage in militant acts for 
different reasons than men. However, that claim cannot be supported without research that 
focuses on male militants that simultaneously acknowledges gender and sex. 
Because there are many methods that could be used to determine why Tamils joined the 
LTTE, there is a need to clearly enunciate what will be explored when examining the available 
data. Did different sexes have different motivations? The answer to that question may have wider 
research implications, including expanding our understanding of modern militant recruitment 
processes and how governments fail their peoples. This thesis focuses on security and identity as 
concepts that explain the different perspectives of males and females who made the decision to 
join the LTTE. 
 To begin, identity and security need to be defined. The thesis focuses on three sub-
categories of identity: ethnicity, culture, and gender. While other forms of identity are important 
(including sexual orientation and individual identity), limiting the scope of identity to ethnicity, 
culture and gender allows us to focus on large themes central to the Sri Lankan conflict. 
Additionally, LTTE recruits often cited identity and security as reasons for joining the 
organization, thereby reinforcing the importance of these categories. 
 Ethnic identity is a subset of identity categories in which membership is determined by 
descent-based attributes. Descent-based attributes include skin colour, language, religion, tribe, 
caste and nationality.
43
 Membership in ethnic groups is ascribed by kinship, unlike membership 
in other political groups (political parties, civil organizations etc.) If an LTTE member were to 
mention the systematic elimination of the Tamil language from Sri Lankan public life as a 
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justification for joining the LTTE, then this justification would be an example where ethnic 
identity was a motivation for violence.  
 Ethnic and cultural identities often overlap, but there are a few notable differences 
between them. While ethnic identity is based on the perception of shared ancestry, cultural 
identity is based on the perception of shared representations, norms, and practices. “One can 
have deep ethnic differences without correspondingly important cultural differences…and one 
can have cultural variation without ethnic boundaries.”44 Using cultural identity as a justification 
for militancy would include stating, as an example, that Tamil exceptionality and the nation’s 
distinct culture were under attack and required a separate state to survive. Because many 
respondents cited both cultural and ethnic identity without making a clear distinction between 
them, and because identity and culture are often reinforcing, this thesis will examine both 
concepts under one sub-category of “ethno-cultural identity.” 
 Like cultural and ethnic identity, gender identity is “a process of negotiation among 
people and interest groups.”45 Like other forms of identity, gender influences how people 
behave, act and relate to the world. If female combatants argued that they found the LTTE’s 
female liberation ideology attractive and that they joined partially due to the organization’s 
stance on gender equality, then this would be an example of gender identity influencing women.  
All forms of identity are constantly evolving. Identity is the result of dialogue between 
the group’s membership and with people outside of the group.46 It is entirely plausible that 
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combatants would justify their involvement in the LTTE using all three sub-categories of identity 
listed above. The thesis places justifications relating to ethnicity, culture and gender under the 
broad category of “identity” and further sub-divides identity into “ethno-cultural” and “gender” 
to illustrate different themes found in the data sample.  
 Security is defined in the thesis as “human security." Human security is a concept that 
rejects traditional state-centered definitions of security. Traditionally, security is defined as the 
safety of the state from external and internal forces. But for many people around the world, much 
greater threats come from hunger and poverty than from external threats to the state. 
Furthermore, “a greater threat may come from their state, rather than from an ‘external 
adversary.’”47  Human security holds that the individual, not the state, is the ultimate referent of 
security. Community, sub-national and supranational and other groups are also referents of 
security, “but the individual is the ultimate one, [as] once individual security is assured, so is the 
security of all other referents.”48  
Human security is a widely employed concept in political science, but one that is much 
debated and has many definitions. For the purposes of this thesis, human security will be defined 
broadly, as first outlined in the 1994 United Nations Development Programme and popularized 
by the United Nations and certain countries frequently referred to as “middle powers.” The UN 
definition of human security, “in its broadest sense, embraces far more than the absence of 
violent conflict. It encompasses human rights, good governance, access to education and health 
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care and ensuring that each individual has opportunities and choices to fulfil his or her 
potential...”49  
 The thesis uses the concept of human security instead of other notions of security because 
it focuses on human welfare and includes but does not prioritize military threats over economic 
threats or threats to accessing education. The concept allows us to consider, for example, 
educational disruption as a factor that influenced personal security and motivated Tamil men and 
women to join the LTTE.   
An important challenge for any researcher is gaining access to available data. While the 
thesis research did not allow for direct interviews with LTTE members, it does cite interviews 
that were conducted by prominent LTTE and Sri Lankan experts, including Catharine Brun, 
Narayan Swamy, and Dagmar-Hellman Rajanayagam. Additionally, the LTTE released 
promotional material such as speeches and videos to be consumed by the general public. The 
civil war in Sri Lanka is of great interest to NGOs and agencies such as Amnesty International, 
the Asian Human Rights Watch, and the OMCT (Organisation Mondiale Contra Torture/World 
Organization Against Torture) have published field reports and assessments readily available on 
their websites. In total, this thesis uses approximately 39 interviews conducted with women, 26 
interviews conducted with men, and 11 separate NGO reports.  
As with other studies, the availability of data dictated what sources could be used. Those 
analysts who interviewed LTTE members faced a number of barriers that likely affected their 
access to information. The Sri Lankan government prevented journalists and academics from 
interviewing incarcerated LTTE members who did not adhere to the government’s version of 
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events. Additionally, researchers seeking to interview active LTTE members needed permission 
from the organization.
50
 Therefore, interviews have been chosen to reflect a variety of data 
collection methods. This thesis uses statements given by members who have received permission 
from the LTTE and the government to speak with the interviewer, but also draws on interviews 
conducted with former members who have fled the conflict and reside as refugees in Canada and 
the United Kingdom. Their status as former combatants is secret and they have consented to 
interviews without government or LTTE approval.  
The variety of sources ensures that themes found throughout interviewee responses are 
not necessarily the result of members reiterating pre-approved LTTE or government beliefs. 
Though individuals could have been chosen for interviews because of their demonstrated 
commitment (or regret, in the case of incarcerated members) to the cause, interviews with 
members who fled the conflict and who may have been less committed to the organization 
increases the credibility of the conclusions.  Additionally, independent NGO reports are useful in 
providing supplementary evidence less influenced by government or militant agendas. The 
conclusions are derived exclusively from this sample. While the thesis may not come to the same 
conclusions as the authors of such papers and reports, it utilizes their interviews to form part of 
the data. The same interviews might be used to form different conclusions. 
In addition to interviews with LTTE members, this thesis uses research that focuses on 
the male and female Tamil civilian population. This research is important in understanding the 
effects of war on the Tamil population. Further, the civilian population was constantly in contact 
with the LTTE because territory was not exclusively controlled by the Sri Lankan government. 
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Civilians knew of the recruitment and propaganda tactics used by the SLDF and LTTE. Civilians 
are therefore included in the sample population, along with female and male LTTE members. 
Academics and journalists, NGOs and activist groups have interviewed LTTE members. 
Though the statements used will reflect a variety of people and organizations that have taken an 
interest in this topic, academics usually base their work on several interviews, and journalists 
will interview one or two people at a time. Therefore more information will be drawn from 
academic fieldwork than interviews conducted by journalists.  
Because questions posed differ from one interviewer to another, conclusions will be 
drawn based on common themes found in interviewee responses. For example, while different 
questions are asked across several interviews, if several respondents mention systematic 
atrocities against the Tamil people because they are Tamil, then a reasonable conclusion could 
be that Tamil civilians were motivated to join the LTTE in part due to atrocities inflicted on 
ethnic Tamils. The variety of interview sources is also used, in part, to ensure the validity of the 
themes found in these interviews. If the same themes are found across NGO reports, interviews 
organized by the LTTE/government, and interviews given by former combatants who have fled 
the war, then the justifications given by interviewees become more substantiated.  
The LTTE was destroyed by the Sri Lankan armed forces in May 2009. However, the 
ramifications of the civil war carry on, and Tamil news agencies continue to criticize the Sri 
Lankan government’s treatment of the Tamil minority, including the poor treatment of Tamil 
women by the SLDF. Therefore, the time period being analyzed within the thesis is limited from 
the inception of the organization to its defeat--or from 1974 to 2009. Statements made by 
combatants after 2009 (which would mean that at the time of the interviews they were ex-
combatants) are used because they contain information about the 1976-2009 time period. 
21 
 
The thesis takes note of the existence of a Tamil minority in India, as that group has also 
had their struggles and challenges. Its political struggle, however, is not identical to the Tamil 
minority’s struggle in Sri Lanka. Therefore, the analysis is limited to the civil war in Sri Lanka 
and the Tamil population within its borders.  
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CHAPTER 3: FEMALES IN THE LTTE 
Women join militant groups for a variety of reasons. The intent of this chapter is to determine 
why women joined the LTTE, and then to compare their reasons with those given by male LTTE 
members in Chapter 4. While women and girls were conscripted into the LTTE, the focus of this 
thesis is on those females and males who volunteered to become Tigers. Volunteers include 
those who were recruited (sought by the LTTE) and those who took the initiative and sought out 
the LTTE. While it is common knowledge that during slow recruitment periods the LTTE 
conscripted, on average, one member per family into the organization, different sources point out 
that more recruits volunteered than were conscripted.
51
  But the choice to volunteer for the LTTE 
was influenced by contextual pressures. Domestic burdens, violent conflict, and social location 
created processes that drove women to join the LTTE.
52
 An analysis of the academic research, 
reports conducted by human rights organizations, and statements given by female Tamil Tigers 
reveal a pattern. 
Women joined the LTTE for reasons relating to group identity and security. They were attracted 
to the LTTE’s stance on gender emancipation and were aware of their gendered positions while 
simultaneously acknowledging that their marginalized status was also based on their ethno-
cultural identity. LTTE females tended to conceptualize security as freedom from threats of 
physical harm, but many interviewees also believed that gender equality was important to living 
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a meaningful life; women spoke of how the LTTE provided them the opportunity to grow and 
become protectors of the Tamil Nation.  
53
 
Gender and Ethno-Cultural Identity 
Female LTTE members have a unique history within the organization. In 1983 the LTTE 
founded the Women’s Front for the Liberation Tigers (Viuthalai Pulikal Munani in Tamil). 
Female fighters in the LTTE were often called “Birds of Freedom” or “Birds of Independence.” 
This was not a formal or institutionalized name, but a colloquial term used by the organization to 
describe the first women who received training in 1985.
54
 Giving these women a unique name 
unshared by men highlighted their revolutionary status. 
55
 
 By October 1987, Prabhakaran had created the first all-women training camp in Jaffna (a 
district located in the far north of Sri Lanka and occupying most of the Jaffna Peninsula.) The 
all-women training camp was completely organized and implemented by the existing women 
cadres. Beginning in the mid-1980s, women cadres in eastern Sri Lanka were engaged in 
dangerous intelligence-gathering activities as underground guerrillas. Initially, female cadres 
were organized in units headed by a male commander, though by September 1989 the women 
headed their own camps and units.
56
 In 1990 approximately 75 percent of the second-generation 
LTTE memberships were below thirty years of age, with approximately 50 percent between the 
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ages of 15 and 21.
57
 Most estimates place female membership in the LTTE at approximately 30 
percent.
58
  
 Females were involved in the most violent battles and in the most dangerous tasks. Some 
of them were Black Tigers (the sub-section of the LTTE that focuses on suicide bombing 
operations), and they were also involved in land, air, and sea operations. Females participating in 
these units sustained a large percentage of casualties. For example, within the Black Tigers there 
were three sub-wings: Military Wing Black Tigers, the Black Sea Tigers, and the Intelligence 
Wing Black Tigers. From 1987 to 2006, 18 female Military Wing Black Tigers were killed in 
combat (compared to 58 male cadres). The casualty count, male to female, for the Black Sea 
Tigers was 48 to 125, and for the Intelligence Wing the number was 9 to 44.
59
 While women in 
the LTTE initially participated in non-violent activities, by the late 1980s they were fighting and 
dying with men.   
 Many reasons are offered as to why the LTTE began recruiting women. A popular theory 
suggests that there was a shortage of manpower in the early 1980s and women were targeted out 
of necessity.
60
 While this explanation is compelling and accurate, it does not explain why women 
and girls tried to initiate their own participation within the organization. Miranda Alison, an 
academic who spent much time in LTTE-controlled Sri Lanka and interviewed many female 
Tigers, argues that young Tamil women wanted to join the LTTE and the organization welcomed 
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them to prove that they were part of an all-encompassing social movement.
61
  Adele Ann, a 
white Australian woman who often acted as an LTTE spokeswoman (and who was also a 
Tiger—Adele Ann is her nom de guerre; her last name is Balasingham) and who wrote several 
autobiographies detailing her time with the LTTE, also confirms that women urged LTTE 
leaders to accept women into the movement; the women who joined the LTTE were sending a 
signal that they were dissatisfied with the status quo. Prabhakaran accepted and encouraged these 
demands, but had to convince his fellow male cadres who had:  
[M]ale chauvinist conceptions of women and their place in society…The emergent 
aspirations of Tamil women to join the armed struggle brought increasing pressure on the 
LTTE leadership to step up its policy of inducting women into the armed struggle. Young 
women demanded their right to self-defence and their right to exercise their patriotic 
sentiments. The LTTE leadership, committed to the emancipation and equality of women, 
welcomed such demands and expanded its military programme for training women. 
62
 
 
The Women’s Front was born out of these negotiations. Their goals were articulated in five 
points:  
1. To secure the right to self-determination for the people of Tamil Eelam and to 
establish an independent democratic state of Tamil Eelam. 
2. To abolish oppressive caste discrimination and divisions, and semi-feudal customs 
such as the dowry system. 
3. To eliminate all discrimination against Tamil women and eliminate all other 
discrimination; to secure social, political and economic equality e.g., equal pay, equal 
opportunities in employment and education. 
4. To ensure that Tamil women control their own lives 
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5. To secure legal protection for women against sexual harassment, rape and domestic 
violence.
63
 
These goals can be divided into two categories. The first goal centres on ethno-cultural 
identity and nationalism, and the last four goals centre on gender identity and security for 
women. All females were automatically members of the Women’s Front, its existence dedicated 
to providing LTTE women an avenue to express militant nationalist sentiments, along with 
creating a gender-sensitive environment that would uphold the tenants of human security. To 
look at the goals of the Women’s Front is to understand what was important to LTTE women. 
They wanted to establish a Tamil homeland and protect civilian and militant women from 
“all…discrimination” both inside and outside the Tamil community.  Paralleling the desire for 
national self-determination, goals 2-5 indicate they also wanted women to determine and control 
their own lives.  
 As shown by the aims of the Women’s Front, many women joined for reasons relating to 
identity and security. Being attached to the LTTE allowed one to create a meaningful life. 
Civilians who felt helpless in war sought an avenue to empower themselves. One Sri Lankan 
activist argued that, after failed political opportunities and Sri Lankan unwillingness to engage 
women in civil society groups, the LTTE became increasingly more attractive to women. 
“[W]omen had this romantic notion of emancipation and were looking for a taste of equality, 
which the rebels were providing.” 64  
Women engaged in militant labour to gain their own and/or collective rights. Even 
though revolutions often substitute one set of male patriarchal rulers with another, militant 
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fighters are people of all ages who work to challenge established states. When women join 
liberation efforts, “they participate in social processes that purport to change colonial power 
relations…Guerrilla warfare provides opportunities for them to change their usual labor, to 
define and exert their own power, and to influence agendas usually controlled by colonial 
government and men at home.”65  
The Women’s Front was influential within the Tamil community. Apart from being 
involved in the LTTE’s social, economic and military activities, it also coordinated activities 
with women’s organizations, trade unions and health centres.66 Due to the considerable time the 
LTTE effectively functioned as a government, female LTTE members became extensively 
involved in Tamil civilian life and helped create political and social agendas that affected 
women. Women stated to various interviewers that they were attracted to inhabiting new roles.
67
 
Several women interviewed mentioned their female identities as a reason for joining the 
LTTE. A pattern emerges when one reads statements by female cadres. Many said that Tamil 
culture had hindered female potential and that the LTTE had allowed women to reach their 
potential by disproving that women were weak. Thamilini, the leader of the Woman’s Front 
Military Wing, stated that, “…[O]ur country’s attitude towards women is different and men are 
always praised for doing harder and cleverer jobs…”68  Several interviewees mentioned that 
Tamil culture frowned on women riding bicycles, climbing trees and going out alone at night. 
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However, the LTTE treated all its soldiers alike and female cadres were allowed to ride 
motorcycles and armoured vehicles.
69
 
The LTTE, and therefore the Women’s Front, believed that female induction into combat 
units was a form of gender emancipation. According to LTTE ideology, any fair society created 
of revolution was not truly fair without the emancipation of women. In an International 
Women’s Day speech, Prabhakaran stated that, “women’s liberation occupies a prominent place 
in our concept of social liberation…If the women who represent the majority of our population 
continue to live in suppression, it is difficult to take forward our liberation struggle as a national 
struggle.”70 The idea that female liberation was won through militant participation was 
reinforced by official spokespersons. In an interview with Anton Raja, an LTTE spokesman, he 
stated, “[i]n the old society, women were cultured and nice. We loved them, but they had no 
major role outside of the kitchen. We went around to the women and told them: “You are the 
equal of men, you have the same rights, you can join us in the struggle.” According to Raja, the 
message must have resonated with Tamil women because, “hundreds and hundreds of women 
signed up to fight.”71  
Raja’s statements directly contradict Adele Ann and frames men as mercifully granting 
women their liberation. (Adele Ann insisted that women tried to persuade LTTE leadership into 
accepting their participation, not the other way around.) His words are telling because they 
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indicate that the LTTE took an official stance on female liberation and that even the organization 
believed women joined, in part, because they agreed with its stance on gender emancipation.  
The organization used female emancipation as a recruitment tool. Even while he did not 
speak of violent resistance, Prabhakaran dedicated many of his speeches to addressing women’s 
rights.   
Women should be awakened from the darkness of an ideological world which makes 
them believe that their oppressive conditions are the result of their fate, of their actions 
of former births, of the moral laws enunciated for them, of the cultural configurations 
that determined their lives. Such an awakening is a necessary condition for their 
emancipation.
72
  
 
Further comments by female fighters suggest that they found this ideology convincing.  
“[W]e will never have to cook or clean and that sort of subordinate [task] for the group…for the 
men.”73 Rather than staying at home, forgotten in undervalued domesticity, LTTE fighters were 
described by Prabhakaran as “…rare human beings; extraordinary beings.”74  
Margaret Trawick, a prominent anthropologist who spent much time with the LTTE, 
asked the young women whether they found their time with the LTTE fulfilling. In one 
interview, a fighter named Sita spoke of the personal satisfaction she felt joining the movement, 
and how she had no desire for marriage because fighting for the liberation of her people was 
enough. She stated that if she had stayed home she would not have had the same opportunities as 
the LTTE had given her, and if she was to die today she would be satisfied because, “when 
people die in the movement, it is a useful death. If I died in the house, there would be nothing 
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remarkable about that.”75 When Trawick asked her, “are you [personally] liberated now?” Sita 
responded, “[a]bsolutely!”76  
Another cadre, Thangaci, who was a soldier in the Sea Tigers, stated that without the 
LTTE she would have been suppressed and would not have had “any awareness about the 
world.”77 However, because she joined the LTTE, she now had self-confidence. Geetha, also a 
soldier, stated that by joining the LTTE she now knew that women were “no less and can do 
anything and everything” and that before she joined the organization she was afraid of the dark 
and would not leave her house during the night. Another soldier, Sudarvili, added that she found 
her time with the LTTE to be fulfilling and said, “through our struggle for liberation we are 
fighting for the women’s liberation also…[W]e will free the girls in this country, not only within 
the movement, outside also.” 78  
A common thread appears from the testimonies of these women. They spoke of a culture 
and a society where different tasks and work were separated by gender. Thamilini mentioned that 
women had been socialized into believing that they could not make their own decisions and that 
someone needed to make decisions on their behalf. However, once she joined the LTTE, she 
realized she could be an active participant in her own life.
79
 
While female liberation was an important motivation for many women to join the LTTE, 
it was not the only reason. One ex-LTTE member stated that while some women joined the 
LTTE for the purpose of female liberation, “many of them are going as part of the liberation, to 
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liberate the homeland. Most females join the movement with the purpose to better the situation 
of the Tamil nation.”80 In fact, interviews with Alison indicate that over half of respondents 
joined, in part, due to nationalist sentiment. Participating in the LTTE also created a sense of 
ethnic pride. Another interviewee reported that, “women feel they are making a positive 
contribution to their motherland which…instils a sense of pride and makes them feel important 
for the Tamil nation.”81   
           Tamil ethnic nationalism has a difficult history and begins with Sri Lankan independence. 
However, there are notable incidents that resulted in the increase of female participation in the 
LTTE. The 1983 Black July riots left a strong impact on the Tamil community, an event which 
was the consequence of a government policy that reduced language rights and led to increased 
militant activity.  The Tamil language had been one of the most important rallying cries in the 
Tamil nationalist movement. But since 1956 it has lost status in Sri Lanka, and because the 
perceived purity of the Tamil language was what differentiated the Tamils from the Sinhalese, 
the loss of language rights was a cutting attack on Tamil identity.
82
 Sinhalese nationalism also 
focused on the importance of language 
83
 The “Sinhala Only” policy, created out of fear that the 
Tamil language was privileged and would undermine Sinhalese attempts at political and 
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economic advancement, was met with a strong backlash. Subsequently, Tamil nationalism was 
constructed as directly hostile to Sinhalese identity.
84
  
Behind it all there is the realization that where the integrity of language is threatened, 
the cultural foundation of ethnicity is also threatened…and with that the very survival 
of the ethnic group. The struggle for the integrity of the Tamil language is identified 
with and is regarded as identical with a defence of the rights of the Tamils in a hostile 
environment. It is a response which has brought the Hindus and Christians…together 
in a common defence of their Tamil culture.
85
  
  
         While Tamil separatism was first articulated through non-violent political means 
(advocated by the Federal Party, the main Tamil party in the Sri Lankan government arguing for 
Tamil sovereignty) the emergence of the youth-lead LTTE interrupted non-violent political 
discourse. Even prior to the LTTE, arguments for self-determination were based on linguistic 
difference. The Federal Party argued that “the present constitution of the country is unsuited to a 
multi-lingual country, and is inimical to the interests of the Tamils living in Sri Lanka. We 
believe that the only means of ensuring that the Tamils are guaranteed their freedoms and self-
respect…[is] to have their own autonomous state guaranteeing self-government.”86 From the 
beginning, separatism was tied to ethno-cultural identity.  
          However, after the LTTE assassinated 13 soldiers and the Sinhalese community retaliated 
with the Black July massacre, the Sri Lankan government capitulated to Sinhalese nationalist 
demands. The Sri Lankan constitution was amended to make parliamentary activity that 
advocated for separatism illegal. Tamil political parties could no longer advocate for separatism 
because the Sinhalese could not differentiate (the inability to differentiate between civilians and 
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combatants was not helped by the Federal Party’s informal ties to the LTTE) between Tamil 
politicians and Tamil militants. Though estimates vary on how many Tamils were killed in the 
riots, what is known is that police and soldiers allowed the violence to occur and did not attempt 
to quell the crowd. Order was restored after a week of rioting. Tamils were held communally 
responsible for the death of the 13 soldiers. The attack on the 13 soldiers occurred because of the 
LTTE’s dissatisfaction with government policies87and to avenge the rape of Tamil schoolgirls by 
Sri Lankan police
88
.   
        Black July only made women more inclined to join the LTTE and reinforced the notion that 
Tamil civilians were being attacked because their ethno-cultural identity was marginalized. Now, 
in addition to policies like Standardization and reduced language rights, Tamil nationalists were 
no longer allowed to pursue separatism through peaceful means. On all issues relating to ethno-
cultural identity, Tamils were being violated.  
       The first female recruits demanded entry into the LTTE shortly after the Black July 
massacre. At the time the LTTE did not have a policy of allowing women to join but they were 
eventually accepted through their own persistence. 
89
The conflict pitted Sinhalese ethno-cultural 
identity versus Tamil ethno-cultural identity; books written by Adele Ann emphasized the purity 
of Tamil identity and how it came under attack. Several LTTE propaganda videos depicted Sri 
Lankan forces drinking alcohol, watching X-rated films and dancing while the Tamil people 
suffered.
90
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 Tamil identity was further reinforced and placed in direct opposition to Sinhalese 
oppression after repeated pleas to stop dropping bombs on the civilian population were ignored. 
Each year, on the anniversary of Black July, martyrs and victims were commemorated. 
Commemorating both martyrdom and victimhood fostered Tamil nationalism and the desire for 
liberation.
91
  
Articles examining cross-regional trends confirm that militants are likely to join 
organizations due to peer influence. Individual identity becomes fused with group 
identity.
92
Militants, especially revolutionary militants, are not outcasts but are seen as heroes 
risking their lives for the public’s welfare.93 The LTTE recruited women as they recruited men: 
with images of heroes and martyrs saving the Tamil nation.  
In poetry written by female LTTE members, combatants explicitly linked their own 
deaths and martyrdom with the land and their people. One poem written by a female cadre finds 
the narrator speaking at the grave of her brother, who died fighting for liberation, while she 
promises to join him soon.
94
 Tamil militant poetry often centres on death, and how dying for a 
cause breeds new life and how one’s blood revitalizes the earth. “Her lips murmur not useless 
utterances, but/ the determined oaths of those who died in battle…The bullets that fire from her 
gun will defeat the enemy without fail!/ It will break the shackles of Tamil Eelam!/ Then our 
people’s lips will/ sing the nation’s song!” 95 
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The poetry is distinctly non-sexual though it does contain maternal influences, with the 
nation and earth conceived as the mother, and a death for a cause being seen as a “birthing” 
process for revitalization. Trawick describes the imagery as “vegetative, horticultural. The 
enemy who cuts you down creates the conditions for ten others to spring up in your place.”96 
Fighting for the nation meant fighting for the mother(land). The nation was constructed as kin. 
The female cadre/poet also connected her identity with Tamils who died in battle before her. Her 
being was connected with the oppression and struggle of previous generations.  
Martyrdom was a ritual reinforced by peers that shared the same ethno-cultural identity. 
This idea was further confirmed when Trawick interviewed Sita. When asked how she felt when 
one of her friends died, Sita stated, “it is painful! We are taught in training how to accept this 
loss. As one friend falls, another comes to take her place…We have a funeral in which each 
friend reads a poem or essay she has written about the friend who has died.”97  
The LTTE, like most competent military organizations, emphasized peer support and 
cohesion. Cadres often referred to one another as family and the death of friends merely 
reinforced commitment to the organization.
98
 Perhaps paradoxically, this further attracted women 
(and men) to the cause. Photographs displaying martyrs in heroic postures were effectively used 
as recruitment posters.
99
  
 A common theme was found throughout different interviews and sources: even though 
Tamil women felt repressed by their own societies and wanted to fight their subservient 
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positions, they also wanted to fight for the liberation of their ethnic community.
100
 “Thanks to 
the movement, our family was saved…I thought if I don’t join the movement, our people will be 
forced into slavery. That’s why I joined the LTTE.”101 Ethno-cultural identity was reinforced by 
loss of language rights and by Tamils becoming violently targeted because of their communal 
membership.   
Security 
The chaos caused by the Sri Lankan civil war extended beyond the killing of Tamil civilians. 
Economic poverty, social displacement, educational/employment disruption, sexual assault, and 
torture of civilians provided more reasons for Tamil females to join the LTTE.   
Displacement and Educational Disruption 
Displacement and communal suffering were motivations cited by women across different 
interviews. Six out of fourteen women Alison interviewed mentioned that family displacement 
and constant fear of military attack were reasons for joining the LTTE, and eight out of fourteen 
respondents chose to enlist because of their anger at the suffering of their communities.
102
 
Thamilvily, the Women’s Political Wing Leader for Jaffna District, spoke of how her village in 
Jaffna was bombed and how this persuaded her, one month after the attack, to join the LTTE. 
She was seventeen. Other female Tigers mentioned that, other from their own personal suffering, 
they saw the results of the SLDF’s aerial bombing, the results of food deprivation, and the deaths 
of their fellow students. Sudarvili’s family was displaced more than once and during this time 
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she witnessed a horrific massacre “which contributed to her desire to stop the insecurity and 
suffering of her community.”103 Sudarvili maintained: 
[W]e feel this is the only way to keep fighting against the military and safeguard the 
people…our people have been suffering. The common places and the churches and kovil 
[Hindu temples] were bombed by the government, without any reason. We don’t have 
anybody to save us and what we feel is if we have someone to safeguard us then there 
won’t be any problems.104 
 
Another female cadre confirmed this report and stated that along with witnessing “the 
enemy” murder her father, she saw several churches bombed. Tamil civilians were told that the 
enemy was coming, “and the people rushed to churches for safety. The army bombed the 
churches, and caused blood to flow within.”105 
Even during the early years of Sri Lankan civil war, women were likely to cite Sri Lankan 
military atrocities against Tamil civilians as a motivating factor for joining the LTTE. In an 
interview with The Telegraph, a woman who joined the organization in 1987 (and left 
voluntarily) stated that by 1985 ethnic clashes had become so severe that the SLDF launched a 
military offensive in Jaffna to wipe out the rebellion. The disruption of ordinary civilian life, the 
constant fear, and the indiscriminate aerial bombing and artillery shelling convinced her to join 
the armed struggle. She was a middle-class Tamil and most female LTTE recruits lived in rural 
areas. Subsequently, the LTTE hesitated when she asked to join, citing her lack of experience 
with physical labour. She was persistent, however, and they relented.
106
  “I tell people the only 
reason I joined the war was to defend my people, because I felt there was no other choice. I was 
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not coerced to join the insurgency. As an idealistic 17-year-old, I believed in the power of the 
individual to make a difference.”107 
Another LTTE woman argued that there was instability in the Tamil nation. “We [women] 
are part of a society—we are not safe at home because of the military atrocities, so it is that 
condition that made us believe we need to be part of a group to liberate the homeland, so we 
volunteer.” 108 LTTE women were alarmed by the disruption of public order. Other than the 
heavy recruitment that occurred after the 1983 riots, many women joined around 1990, which 
was one of the worst war-time periods for civilians. One cadre, Prasanthi, stressed that her area 
was constantly being attacked by the military. Her classmate’s family was killed and she saw 
people being thrown into fires and others being dragged off buses and killed.
109
  
According to these interviews, women joined the LTTE because they saw others suffer and 
because war created personal and communal insecurity. Malaimalli, a female LTTE cadre, when 
asked why she had joined the organization, responded that her younger sister had been 
imprisoned and tortured. During detention Sinhalese policemen had peeled the skin off her leg 
and rubbed pepper in the wound, and then they pulled off her fingernails. Now she stayed home 
but was unable to do anything. Her older sister saw her husband shot before her eyes. Malaimalli 
said that there were sixteen thousand widows in Batticola (the area she resided) and that 
marriage only made widows. She said that she went to war in search of a peaceful life.
110
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 It was shortly after the Indian Peacekeeping Forces left Sri Lanka in 1989 that the LTTE 
came to dominate much of north-eastern Sri Lanka. However, by the summer of 1990 the Sri 
Lankan Defence Forces resumed aerial bombing LTTE controlled areas (aerial bombing had 
stopped once the Indian Peacekeeping Forces entered Sri Lanka.) Most of the casualties were 
civilians. The LTTE, however, avoided mass casualties by hiding in protective bunkers in the  
jungle.
111
 Indiscriminate civilian targeting, often with the aid of local gangs, turned many local 
Tamils into LTTE supporters.
112
  
Adele Ann argued that women had tried to instigate peaceful political change for nearly 
two decades. Only when that failed, when the Sri Lankan government ignored their demands for 
a peaceful solution, did women turn to militancy. She argued that female political involvement 
existed before the LTTE and so it made sense that women would continue to defend their 
homeland violently. She argued, therefore, that their participation in the LTTE was not an 
aberration.
113
   
Adele Ann’s autobiographies described the Tamil people as victims of Sinhalese state 
oppression. Her writing emphasized the LTTE’s beginnings as a peaceful movement and 
described how the organization adopted violence when all other options were exhausted.  Adele 
Ann’s arguments, therefore, centred on the need to defend the Tamil people and how an ethnic 
minority had been systematically targeted for oppression. She cites these arguments as major 
reasons for women joining the LTTE. Her writing is especially important because, as a native 
English speaker, she was one of the most prominent LTTE spokespeople. She writes that “the 
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[c]onstant exposure to oppression has had a profound effect on the life and thinking of young 
Tamil women.” 114 There is also a strong correlation between security and ethno-cultural 
identity. Many statements, while explicitly referencing security, also allude to the idea that 
communal oppression builds ethnic solidarity and that ethnic identity is reinforced through 
oppression.  
There was a strong correlation between experiencing physical insecurity and joining the 
LTTE. Most of the women in the LTTE came from northern Sri Lanka, a heavily militarized area 
where daily civilian routines were interrupted by warfare.  “The permanent insecurity of this 
environment inculcated a desire for freedom and statehood, which included the motivation to 
take up arms.”115  
When interviewed by Alison, many women cited a sense of communal suffering as a 
reason for joining. Alison found that one motivation to enlist that fuelled nationalist ideology 
was the experience and perception of Tamil suffering. “Sometimes this…[was]… related to a 
personal family experience; sometimes it has been received as part of the Tamil narrative of 
oppression and suffering, borne out by the experiences of one’s friends and neighbours.”116 The 
testimonials given by female cadres often involved witnessing the death of a loved one; four of 
the fourteen women Alison interviewed mentioned the death of a family member as a reason for 
joining the LTTE.
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Other studies confirm that former female LTTE members conceptualized liberation both 
individually and collectively.
118
 Females either felt the loss of security intimately, usually in the 
loss of a family member or friend, or the loss of security came through a sense of communal 
suffering: being Tamil meant having a life usurped by civil war. Female Tamil Tigers joined the 
LTTE, in part, to end Sri Lankan military action that mainly affected civilians. Female Tigers 
hoped to achieve in least one tenet of human security––civilian security against domestic 
military aggression. 
 However, women also joined the LTTE to achieve human security, defined broadly in 
Chapter 2. A basic right that is included in the concept of human security is the right to 
education. Clearly, war disrupts education and prevents children from finishing secondary school 
and entering university. It also interferes with a person’s economic security by, for example 
preventing an individual from pursuing professional training or some other specific means of 
securing his/her livelihood.  
At the time of the Sri Lankan civil war, Tamil civilians were unable to pursue education 
because of “standardization,” a policy seeking to correct ethnic imbalances that existed prior to 
Sri Lankan independence. Standardization effectively prevented many Tamils from gaining 
admission into university. Though the Tamil minority placed great value on post-secondary 
education, educational disruption began prior to secondary school and during childhood.   
In one study, young men and women told the interviewer that going to school was at the 
centre of their childhood memories and that educational disruption meant having to carry their 
school books over long distances or otherwise keeping up with the hardships of studying during 
war. “Tamil youth in Jaffna were very conscious about the number of rights they had been 
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denied, particularly in relation to education, employment and language. In their view, this 
deprivation of rights was the chief cause of the conflict.” 119 
Educational disruption continued into late adolescence, a time when Tamil children 
would be studying for university entrance exams. Many women joined the LTTE because the 
war destroyed their educational prospects. For example, Thamilini was studying her A Levels 
(Advanced Levels—senior courses required to determine university placements) in 1990, but the 
war made studying extremely difficult and she was unable to go to university. One cadre 
(Banuka) further stated, “only when we have a peaceful country, we can study safely and have 
freedom to do our own things; without that we cannot do our schooling safely.”120  When 
speaking of education, many female cadres argued that the physical insecurity of their 
environment prevented them from going to school.  
Studying for university in the midst of war was exceedingly difficult. State policies 
erected barriers against Tamil education. The LTTE, however, provided practical skills and 
training for women. LTTE photographers were given lessons in photography and middle-aged 
women received computer training. Women who had lost a child in the service of the LTTE were 
given simple employment (such as being a cook for recruits.)
121
 The Eelam police, the LTTE’s 
de facto police force, actively recruited women and paid better wages than what they were likely 
to receive working for the state.
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 One female Tiger stated that she simply could not study when people around her were 
suffering. She had worked in the political wing of the LTTE, where they had tried to resolve 
problems relating to inadequate food and clothing. The job of her division had been to help 
alleviate suffering. They could not simply hand out food and clothing, she said, because they 
were not a government; they had been struggling to form a government so they could resolve 
problems relating to education and poverty.
123
 In other words, displacement had created barriers 
to education and employment.  
 Even though the LTTE provided women with practical training and employment, it 
would be a mistake to assume that the recruits saw the organization simply as a path to economic 
security––or that they underestimated their chances of dying. Rather, the attitude amongst 
supporters and members was inevitable resignation—they were all going to die one day, so better 
die this way.
124
  
Sumantra Bose argues that, like men, women were alienated from the state.
125
 The 
country’s war torn status appears to have strongly influenced female involvement with the 
LTTE. Women joined to “escape numerous societal insecurities.”126 When, in retaliation to 
LTTE military tactics, the Sri Lankan government cut off electricity and telecommunications, 
thereby denying the civilian population mobility, communication, and heating, Tamils were even 
more likely to flock to the LTTE and blame Sinhala oppression for destroying their livelihood.
127
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The LTTE advertised itself as an organization that offered women protection from Sri Lankan 
abuse while also providing them with an opportunity to eradicate social injustice. Displacement 
and the disruption of ordinary civilian life motivated women to join the LTTE. 
Sexual Assault 
Much has been written about the relationship between violence and increased militancy.
128
 Many 
writers have argued that witnessing and hearing about rape, even if one has not been raped 
oneself, creates a feeling of communal helplessness. This was one of the main reasons females 
joined the LTTE.
129
   
Using rape as a narrative structure, as a justification for women’s violence, can 
potentially portray women as either biologically or psychologically handicapped. Their 
womanhood frustrated (in this case by sexual assault), their justifications for violence become 
largely apolitical and framed as seeking vengeance for lost femininity.
130
  This thesis does not 
take the position that sexual assault is an apolitical act. 
 The official position of the LTTE Women’s Wing was that rape was a political act and 
that society needed to be restructured in order to emancipate women. However, the Wing’s first 
goal was to achieve an independent Tamil state. Such goals formed the dominant narrative, 
representative of female cadres collectively. They had political goals and fought the Sri Lankan 
state, but they also talked about their personal lives. Seemingly then, Tamil women became 
angry when public order (defined here as lack of war) was frustrated. Nevertheless, many 
observers outside the LTTE believe sexual assault is an apolitical motivator, reinforcing the 
                                                 
128
 Mia Bloom, “Death Becomes Her: Women, Occupation, and Terrorist Mobilization¸” Political Science and 
Politics, 43 (2010): 3. 
129
 Mia Bloom, “Female Suicide Bombers: a Global Trend,” Daedalus 136 (Winter 2007): 1. 
 
130
 Laura Sjoberg and Caron E. Gentry, Mothers, Monsters, Whores: Women’s Violence in Global Politics (New 
York: Zed Books, 2007), 175. 
45 
 
belief that war is something men do, that men are political creatures, and women are private 
domestic creatures uninterested in military politics.  
Avoiding this problem, however, is simple. Constructing motivations for violence as 
either political, in the public sphere sense, or as experiences resulting from the frustrated private 
sphere (and thus opening the way for psychoanalyzing women) reduces complex motivations to 
false dichotomies. To understand female involvement in the LTTE, and to understand the 
narratives employed by the organization, there cannot be a strict separation between actions 
committed in the public and private spheres. War infiltrates homes and creates public disorder. 
War does not stay in what is traditionally defined (by Aristotle, Hannah Arendt, and Jürgen 
Habermas, to name a few) as the public realm.  
Adele Ann, for example, spoke of a desire for self-defence and its connection to rape. She 
argued that on an individual level, rape is experienced as a despicable and gross violation of 
personal autonomy and as an act of mental and physical torture. On the collective level, “rape 
aims to violate and humiliate the norms of society. The violation of women outrages the dignity 
and deeply offends the national sentiments and feelings of a nation. While women may be used 
as mediums to humiliate the feelings of a nation...the overall objective is the genocide of the 
people.”131  
According to Alisa Stack-O’Connor, the LTTE used fear of rape by the enemy to recruit, 
motivate and control Tamil women and to denigrate its opponents. A U.S official who served in 
Sri Lanka reported seeing an LTTE billboard aimed at recruiting women. The billboard was split 
in two, with one side depicting a woman being raped by Sri Lankan soldiers and on the other half 
a woman in an LTTE uniform with the caption, “[Y]our daughter will meet Sri Lankan soldiers 
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one way or the other.”132 The LTTE publicized reports of rape and sexual assault to delegitimize 
the Sri Lankan and Indian governments. Both male and female leadership used the sexual 
victimization of Tamil women by the SLDF and Indian Peacekeeping forces to justify violent 
attacks. It has never been proven whether this propaganda functioned as a successful recruitment 
tool. 
 In her interviews, Alison discovered that the threat of rape did provide a reason for 
women to join the LTTE. Thamilini, for example, believed that rape and sexual violence affected 
a minority of women, but that the climate of fear that these acts created affected all girls and 
women. Thamilini joined the organization, in part, from fear of sexual violence.
133
  
Female combatants were aware that their violent participation as women placed them in a 
uniquely treacherous position. One fighter told a journalist that the reason she wore the cyanide 
capsule around her neck was because suicide was especially important for a female. “A man can 
be tortured…but a woman has more to lose—her virtue.”134 The Sri Lankan army’s reputation 
for sexual assault was well known to LTTE members and Tamil civilians. These recruitment 
tactics were particularly convincing because they matched reality. Enough empirical evidence 
exists to say that Tamil civilians faced systemic sexual assault.  
In comparison to the SLDF, the LTTE was a haven for female activism. In 1999, two Sri 
Lankan officers entered a household with ties to the LTTE. They inquired about one male LTTE 
member, named Napoleon, who was not home at the time. However, his sister, also an LTTE 
member, was home. Her name was Ida Carmelita and she was repeatedly raped, shot in the 
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genitals, and mutilated. According to autopsy reports, her lips and breasts were bitten off.
135
  
Amnesty International reports that torture (including sexual torture) was among the most 
frequently cited human rights violations in the Sri Lankan civil war.
136
 In the north and east, 
where the LTTE was dominant for several years, Tamil civilians were arrested and tortured on 
suspicion of being LTTE sympathizers. There were usually high numbers of arrests after LTTE 
military operations. Most of these allegations of torture concerned the SLDF, the Sri Lankan 
navy, and Special Task Forces.
137
  
 For every year of the conflict (and now, post-civil war) Amnesty International received 
several reports of cases involving sexual torture. In most of these cases, investigations were slow 
or had collapsed because victims or witnesses feared reprisals. Some victims were compelled to 
withdraw police statements after being offered large sums of money.
138
   
Additionally, the OMCT (World Organization Against Torture) has several extensive 
reports on the misuse of state authority against LTTE members and Tamil civilian women . The 
Sri Lankan authorities are known for their arbitrary arrests and torture of Tamil activists. They 
have abducted parents and family members who are related to LTTE cadres. The OMCT has 
found that Tamil women and girls were continuously abducted during the war, and most cases of 
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violence against women have not been thoroughly investigated. “Few prosecutions have resulted 
in proportionate or dissuasive punishments being applied to the perpetrators.”139  
Similarly, the Asian Human Rights Commission (AHRC) writes that criminal 
investigations have not been conducted regarding most cases of sexual assault, torture, and 
disappearances of Tamil women and men. As late as January 2000, the AHRC reported that Sri 
Lankan Security forces were systematically sexually assaulting and murdering Tamil women to 
subjugate the Tamil population. What the AHRC called a “familiar method” was to transfer the 
accused soldiers from the area of the attack to prevent action being taken against them.
140
 The Sri 
Lankan Supreme Court has frequently confirmed that a “climate of impunity” exists in relation to 
torture. “The fact that police officers continue to commit such unlawful acts, including torture, 
despite regular judicial condemnation of such acts, shows that the authorities have permitted 
such acts by their failure to impose effective sanctions.”141   
 According to Elizabeth Jean Wood, the Sri Lankan army never explicitly ordered its 
soldiers to sexually assault Tamil women, but sexual violence was still prevalent. There were 
two patterns of state-sponsored sexual violence of girls and women (and also boys and men, to 
be discussed in the following chapter.) Sexual torture in detention usually occurred at police 
stations and army bases. Torture took a myriad of forms and included rape with plantain flowers 
soaked in chillies, bottles or other objects, electric shocks, the application of chillies to the 
genitals, piercing of male genitals, forced sexual relations with other prisoners, and slamming 
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testicles in a drawer. The second pattern of state-sponsored sexual violence targeted women at 
checkpoints and during military or police operations. One SLDF officer stated, “…it depends on 
the field commanders: Good commanders don’t allow it, keep tight rein on discipline…At road 
blocks and check points, rape happens because of a lack of supervision and monitoring.”142 
Another serving officer said, “I can’t control my troops…they open fire on everyone, they 
destroy everything in sight, they rape and torture people they catch on the streets or in their 
homes…I’ve tried to stop them, I try to control the situation. I can’t. None of the commanders 
can—though God knows some don’t try.” 143 
Indeed, stories about the horrors of passing through checkpoints are shared amongst the 
Tamil community. In a particularly infamous case, an 18 year old Tamil woman named 
Krishanthi Kumaraswami was arrested while passing through a Sri Lankan Army checkpoint in 
1996. Her mother, younger brother, and a neighbour went to the checkpoint to find her and 
refused to leave until the soldiers released her. The soldiers killed all three of them, and an hour 
later they gang raped Kumaraswami and buried her body. One Tamil school teacher speaking to 
the Washington Post said, “[e]very Tamil remembers the Krishanthi case…For us, the 
checkpoints are sort of a slow-motion thing, the trauma and the fear that we go through.”144  
Wood writes that there are several reasons why troops might ignore their superiors and 
perpetuate sexual violence. In the case of Sri Lankan troops, Wood argues that if leaders judge 
sexual violence to be counterproductive to their interests and if the hierarchy is strong enough, 
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then sexual violence will be limited. She judges the organizational hierarchy in the Sri Lankan 
army to be weak and believes that officers did not have full control of their troops.
145
  
 SLDF sexual abuse against Tamil civilians had severe ramifications. Particularly vicious 
attacks by female cadres were justified as being revenge for rape. The Women’s Front justified a 
particularly infamous night attack that killed 15 police officers and wounded 20 by stating, 
“[W]e wanted to avenge the rape of Koneswary Murugesupillai. We are proud that we are able to 
destroy the police station where she was raped and killed.”146   
Similarly, Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Ghandi was assassinated by a female LTTE 
suicide bomber. Known only as Dhanu, the LTTE reported that she had been gang-raped by the 
Indian Peacekeeping Forces and had volunteered for the mission as a form of revenge. Her 
personal security––her ability to live without violent interference and loss of human dignity––
was robbed.
147
 
 According to Adele Ann, rape is to be equated with murder, as it destroys a person’s 
mental and emotional personhood. Collective retribution, in the form of women attacking and 
destroying a police station, as in the case of Murugesupillai, was a method of restoring dignity to 
society and to women. Adele Ann used this narrative to explain why women fought and joined 
the LTTE. Her explanations were further reinforced by former LTTE members. One female 
cadre reported that, “our anger is at our impotence and powerlessness. We feel that our physical 
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selves, our womaness are under control of these marauders, who take what they want as their 
will and pleasure.”148 
Another soldier reported that fear of rape was part of the reason she joined the LTTE. She 
said that everyone had to protect themselves and that she had to protect the Tamil people, 
indicating further that some female members had viewed the organization as an important means 
of creating security for women, and that these members played a vital role in protecting 
themselves and other women.
149
 In these operations, women perceived themselves as vital 
protectors of women and Tamil society and saw the LTTE as giving them the opportunity to be 
protectors.  
 Further, within the LTTE, unlike the SLDF, there was an absence of sexual violence. 
Even though the LTTE was responsible for much violence against civilians, the recruitment of 
children for military duty, and attempts at ethnically cleansing northern Sri Lanka of Muslim and 
Sinhala civilians (global patterns reveal that sexual violence is often used as a form ethnic 
cleansing), they had a strict policy against sexual violence. The University Teacher for Human 
Rights (Jaffna), a prominent Sri Lankan organization that evaluates allegations made against 
both the LTTE and SLDF, has corroborated reports that the SLDF was responsible for systemic 
sexual violence. However, the group reports comparatively few, if admittedly horrific cases by 
LTTE cadres. The most specific allegations concern two cases, the first which occurred on June 
15
th
, 2002, when an LTTE cadre raped a girl who had managed to escape after being forcefully 
conscripted into the LTTE. 
150
 In the other case, four cadres gang raped a 13-year-old girl. “As 
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punishment, their hands were bound [by the LTTE] and they were dragged behind a tractor. At 
the end their bodies were torn up, and they were crying for water when they died.”151 In a 1991 
interview with Peter Schalk, female cadres enjoyed relaying the story about a student who 
slapped his girlfriend and was immediately detained by the LTTE for six months, although he 
had a father in a high position within the organization. Appeals from his father to Prabhakaran 
did not alter his punishment.
152
 Also worth nothing is that, according to Adele Ann, regular 
Tamil society usually blamed women for their own rape. She said that the LTTE did not view 
rape this way and instead described sexual violence as an ‘accident,’ meaning that it was not the 
victim’s fault.  
 Even though there were a large number of child recruits, including a large number of 
girls, there have never been any allegations of child sexual abuse against the organization. The 
LTTE, therefore, not only provided women a chance to be enablers of security, but also created a 
militant group that functioned as a safe space against sexual violence. From its early days, the 
LTTE was seen as an advocate of women’s equality and rights, goals that were not seemingly 
promoted by the SLDF or Sri Lankan Government. 
 Even closer to the end of the war, when the LTTE prevented civilians from leaving 
heavily targeted areas, Tamils were still fearful of seeking safety in government-controlled areas. 
Tamils who fled LTTE controlled areas were often detained by Sri Lankan armed forces. Many 
civilians remained in locations that were heavily shelled and bombed. They saw no use in 
seeking security from the Sri Lankan government.
153
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Armed groups can prevent their  members from engaging in sexual violence if the armed 
group sees itself as “the embryo of a new, more just social order.”154 Such groups are unlikely to 
violate the norms of the just society they seek to create. Acts of sexual violence de-legitimize the 
armed group’s ideology in the eyes of its members and its constituents. The LTTE accepted 
women into its ranks, in part, because of their symbolic power in persuading outside observers 
that the organization was an all-encompassing social movement. The LTTE saw itself as a 
harbinger of social justice, and women in the LTTE constructed a just society as one that 
respected gender and ethnic identity while also fulfilling the basic tenets of human security.  
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CHAPTER 4: MALES IN THE LTTE 
Sri Lanka has been mired in ethnic conflict since 1956, when the first racial riots erupted over 
constitutional language issues. However, while an unorganized Tamil minority would sometimes 
retaliate violently against perceived oppression, formalized militant groups did not exist until the 
late 1960s and early 1970s.
155
 The LTTE was officially formed in 1974-1976 (the exact date is 
uncertain) with membership restricted to males until 1983.
156
 Until the end of the organization’s 
existence, Tamil males sixteen years and older were the most likely demographic to join the 
LTTE.
157
 LTTE members were called “the boys,” a reflection of their gender and age, and 
largely came from a disaffected group of university youth. The label also referred to their 
rebelliousness against established Tamil norms, as illustrated by their adoption of violent 
methods to achieve political gains.
158
 
Gender and Ethno-Cultural Identity 
Women in the LTTE joined after the Black July massacre, an event unrivalled by previous ethnic 
riots. Men in the LTTE have a different history; while women framed their reasons for enlisting 
by speaking about protecting the nation, their ethno-cultural and gender identity, and racial 
divisions that hurt the Tamil people, men were more likely to speak of their personal experiences 
with pain, humiliation, and deprived employment opportunities. According to the literature 
sample, males in the LTTE were more likely than females to have experienced SLDF brutality 
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when they were civilians. Females joined because of the insecurity felt by their communities and 
families, but did not go into detail about their own individual pre-LTTE encounters with the Sri 
Lankan forces. In addition to speaking of their families and communities, men spoke of 
themselves.  
 Depending on the rank of the interviewee, the LTTE’s male members gave different 
reasons for enlisting. The LTTE leadership, comprised mainly of men, spoke often of ethnic and 
cultural identity and racial hatred. Ethnic differences were cited in recruitment speeches and 
many lower-ranking males found these appeals persuasive. Lower-ranking members were also 
likely to explain ethnic alienation by citing their compromised personal safety, lack of economic 
prospects, and educational disruption. In fact, unlike women who joined after and as a result of 
the 1983 riots, men first joined after their educational prospects were compromised by 
government policies that placed university quotas on Tamil youth.  They continued to join after 
the government’s military response compromised their physical security. The spark that ignited 
militancy in both sexes was different.  
Gender Identity 
Often, the terms ‘gender’ and ‘women’ are conflated.159 Traditionally, literature on gender has 
focused on women and how women’s contributions and knowledge have been neglected in 
political and historical accounts. However, ‘gender’ and ‘women’ are not synonyms because men 
also live their lives in gendered ways. Gender is an analytic category for “how we categorize, 
think about, and ‘know’ the world.”160 Men are not excluded from a gendered analytical 
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framework. However, because men are the standard to which all are compared, they are often 
omitted from accounts that focus on gender, further contributing to the otherness of ‘femininity’ 
and reinforcing the naturalness of ‘masculinity.’ Additionally, there are multiple masculinities 
(there is not only one type of man) as there are multiple femininities. Men follow normative 
ascriptions that dictate how they should behave and identify themselves. Hegemonic masculinity 
(hegemonic males are often colloquially referred to as “alpha males”) varies based on time and 
place. Traits that define the “ideal male” are not static and depend on culture and time period.  
 Hegemonic masculinity is the culturally idealized form of manhood and encompasses a 
set of behaviours and beliefs that, when put into practice, work to undervalue and often dominate 
other masculine identities. Hegemonic masculinity is often treated as natural, though it 
encompasses a set of normative prescriptions. Because male militants are considered the norm, 
their gender is precluded as a motivation for enlisting. Female militants are not privy to this 
mixed blessing because femininity is constructed as peaceful and non-aggressive. Subsequently, 
when journalists and academics asked women why they joined the LTTE, gender was central to 
the questions interviewers asked.
161
 The female militants, as explained in the previous chapter, 
were aware of and highlighted their gender as a reason for joining the LTTE. In interviews 
conducted by Margaret Trawick and M. R. Narayan Swamy, males in the LTTE did not speak of 
their gender as a reason for involvement. The silence on gender was apparent throughout 
interviews conducted by both journalists and academics and was reinforced by NGO reports that 
did not cite gender as a reason for males joining militant organizations. The silence may have 
been because the interviewers did not ask questions about gender or because interviewees felt it 
was not worth stating. There are, however, significant gendered experiences that contributed to 
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males joining the LTTE. Men and boys who live in periods of social change and disruption are 
more likely to “‘suffer domination…and other forms of discrimination from other men due to 
issues such as ethnicity, sexuality, class and religion.”162 
 While men were unlikely to cite gender identity as a reason for joining the LTTE, gender 
still affected the ways in which they were militarily targeted by the Sinhalese. Tamil males were 
more likely than females to disappear and face torture at checkpoints and in prisons because the 
Sinhalese assumed that Tamil men were more likely to be violent than Tamil women. Tamil 
masculinity was problematized by the Sinhalese because of the assumption that men were more 
likely than women to become militants. The Sinhalese armed forces made a gendered 
assumption. 
Men and boys were systematically targeted by the SLDF and killed. Some Tamil women 
specifically harnessed their maternal identities to seek accountability for their “disappeared” 
sons, men and boys who never returned to their homes.
163
  The Sri Lankan government’s ethnic 
and gender profiling has consequently resulted in a dramatic increase in female-headed 
households (defined as the absence of a male adult who contributes financially to the household) 
in Tamil-dominated areas and Tamil refugee camps. In Sri Lanka, a fifth of households are 
female-headed, a much higher percentage than surrounding countries.
164
 Men formed a higher 
percentage of casualties, whether they were militants or civilians. Tamil men were targeted 
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because of the intersection of their ethnicity and sex, though this practice later changed when 
women became involved with the LTTE. 
There is a model of masculinity that is hegemonic and specific to Tamil culture. Most 
male LTTE members were young (18-35), unmarried, and had no children.
165
 They were meant, 
according to Prabhakaran’s prescriptions that he modelled on historical expectations, to be 
ascetics. Males in the LTTE were required to be chaste, an important cultural concept known in 
the Tamil language as karpu. LTTE members
166
 were also described as maravar.  Maravar is an 
honorary designation given to LTTE fighters, and is a term that has its basis in Tamil folklore 
and the ideal male warrior.  Maravar are expected to be selfless, self-sacrificing, and separate 
from worldly pleasures.
167
   
However, like the nearly unreachable female ideal, hegemonic masculinity is rarely 
attained and practised by men. Hegemonic masculinity is a set of prescriptions that, while 
idealized, does not accurately reflect men’s lives. Male LTTE members revealed to interviewers 
that these normative prescriptions were not being met. Men joined specifically because of their 
worldly problems, which included a lack of economic opportunity and the fear of being 
physically targeted by Sinhalese police and army forces. The maravar and the ideals this 
designation signifies were not mentioned by male respondents.  
Masculinity is not only inward looking, but forms a set of prescriptions that focuses on 
relationships between men. In opposition to the chaste male Tamil warrior and following the 
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wartime trend of masculinity being constructed along ethnic lines,
168
 the LTTE constructed 
Sinhala men as sexual assaulters who were immoral and oversexed.
169
  “Jaffna Tamils extend the 
characterization of unchastity and uncivility to the Sinhala people, who are likewise thought to 
exemplify the pitfalls of a more easygoing sexual life.”170 Similarly, the Sinhalese viewed Tamils 
as inherently dangerous, “creatures who excesses from time try even the saintly patience of 
majority Buddhists.”171 Violent reactions to Tamil transgressions became acceptable and 
understandable to the majority population. 
 Male members did not mention joining the LTTE based on their own perceptions of male 
inadequacy amongst the Sinhalese, though a few did mention that the Sinhalese were “bad.”172 
That does not mean that gender was irrelevant and that male soldiers cannot be judged using a 
gendered perspective. It means that the LTTE placed heavy focus on female liberation; the 
organization constructed gender awareness as women “waking up from the darkness”173 and not 
as something which impacted male behaviour or their involvement in the LTTE. LTTE elites 
framed gender as something women, not men, did. Male LTTE members were silent on how 
gender influenced their decisions to join the organization. Throughout the various interviews 
used in this chapter, males did not cite gender as a reason for joining the LTTE, though many 
spokespeople and observers have noted that Tamil males faced specific challenges living in a 
conflict-zone. 
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 Male militancy has been constructed as the norm and consequently male motivations for 
joining militant organizations have been seriously under-researched or integrated into theoretical 
approaches that treat them as sexless.  
[I]n comparison to other institutions in society, defense and military institutions 
have been associated with specific gender stereotypes, surprisingly consistent across 
both cultures and time. ..Once a particular set of behaviors has been established as 
the norm for appropriate conduct within any institution, it becomes difficult to 
critique, in part, because normativity makes certain practices appear ‘natural’, 
beyond discussion. In the history of most military institutions, masculinity has been 
normalized and regularized.
174
   
  
According to the literature, male silence on gender is to be expected because male 
violence is normalized and therefore more difficult to question. However, Tamil males had 
significant gendered experiences, as evidenced by their increased chances (in relation to females) 
of facing physical torture and arbitrary detention at Sri Lankan checkpoints. The silence on the 
issue, therefore, should not be interpreted to mean that gender was irrelevant, but points to a 
more systemic bias found in international relations.  
Ethno-Cultural Identity 
It is not by chance the LTTE called itself the “Liberation Tigers.” Ancient Tamil kings used the 
tiger as part of their royal emblem during a time when Jaffna was a conquering kingdom and the 
Tamil language, culture, and Hinduism flourished.
175
 The LTTE’s tiger emblem can also be 
understood as a reaction to the lion on the Sri Lankan flag. One of Sri Lanka’s earliest post-
British independence ethnic controversies surrounded the national flag. The lion has symbolic 
and cultural resonance with the Sinhalese. “Instead of choosing a flag with a secular, neutral 
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symbol which would evoke equal loyalty from all the people of Sri Lanka, the UNP government 
decided to choose the Lion flag of ancient Sinhalese kings with colored stripes for the 
minorities.”176 The symbols and language employed within the conflict emphasized ethnic and 
cultural tensions, which, in turn, facilitated the growth of violent Tamil nationalism. Tamil elites 
and militants criticized government education and language policies in the late 1960s and early 
1970s, but quickly shifted their criticisms to include the escalating military violence inflicted on 
the Tamil minority during and after Black July.   These ethnic tensions were reasons many young 
men became militants. Tamils males were recruited using ethno-cultural appeals. 
 Lower-ranking males discussed the ethnic conflict by citing physical insecurity caused by 
military atrocities and oppressive educational and employment public policy. These reasons are 
related to ethno-cultural identity because government policies were enacted that were based on a 
politics of ethnic differentiation. In contrast, LTTE male elites justified their violence by 
speaking more generally about racism, the nation and “Sinhalese chauvinists.” Prabhakaran 
would often emphasize the differences between the two ethnic groups by saying, for example, 
that the Sinhalese and Tamils were “two distinct nations…two separate peoples with divergent 
and mutually incompatible ideologies, consciousness and political goals.”177 The LTTE 
mimicked this language from nationalists that protested peacefully before the organization was 
created. 
Tamil political parties used strong language when arguing against policies like 
colonization and standardization. In May 1976, a coalition of Tamil political parties (the TULF) 
issued a resolution charging that the Sri Lankan government and the country’s constitution aimed 
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to make Tamils “a slave nation ruled by the new colonial master, the Sinhalese, who are using 
the power they have wrongly usurped to deprive the Tamil nation of its territory, language, 
citizenship, economic life, opportunities of employment and education thereby destroying all the 
attributes of the nationhood of the Tamil people.”178   
The LTTE’s demands were reinforced in press conferences, news releases and 
celebratory speeches where Prabhakaran would state that, in order for a peaceful solution to 
become viable, the Sri Lankan government would have to acknowledge the Tamil right to a 
homeland, a distinct nationality and self-determination.
179
 The LTTE refused to accept the Sri 
Lankan government as a legitimate representative of the Tamil people, and in a press conference 
the LTTE ideologue Anton Balasingham stated that while Sri Lanka had a Prime Minister, 
Vellupillai Prabhakaran was the “Prime Minister and President of Tamil Eelam.”180  Nationhood 
and governmental legitimacy were divided on ethnic lines. Some Tamils viewed the Sri Lankan 
state as a government reserved for the Sinhalese and consequently, the LTTE appeared to be a  
legitimate governing body. An LTTE spokesman compared Sri Lankan governance over the 
Tamil people as “the story of the wolf caring for the sheep” and argued that the Sinhalese 
government (the LTTE referred to the Sri Lankan government as the “Sinhalese government” 
even though not all elected members were Sinhalese) had plans for “racial annihilation … 
thereby…[destroying]…the freedom struggle.”181 The government was viewed as being unable 
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to provide social justice for the Tamil people, thereby diminishing its claim to be the legitimate 
representative of all Sri Lankans. It was for these reasons Prabhakaran and his group of close 
male associates formed the LTTE and became violent. 
 While the young men who were first involved in the LTTE told interviewers that they 
agreed with the TULF’s sentiment, they still found parliamentary politics ineffective in 
advancing their goals. Prabhakaran, in particular, agreed with the Tamil intellectuals who 
rejected the idea that non-violent politics would secure the goal of a Tamil Eelam. “My natural 
inclination makes me lay less emphasis on words. In serious politics, it won’t do to concentrate 
on talking; you must grow through action and then talk…Words must be matched and indeed 
preceded by content.”182  Disenfranchised from the political process, revolutionary struggle 
became the path to reasserting group identity and establishing a self-determined state.
183
  As 
leader of the LTTE, Prabhakaran stated that a “fair and reasonable solution” could not be 
expected from “the Sinhala nation…buried in the mud of racist policies.”184  Militancy became 
the main path for youth participation in Sri Lankan society. The alternatives to militarization 
were the youth clubs and sports meetings arranged by NGOs, spaces where opportunities for 
political change were minimal.
185
 
 Even though Tamil intellectuals and politicians provided ideological justifications for 
violence, young Tamil men became disillusioned with politicians and felt that the main Tamil 
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political parties were elitist, too willing to condescend to Sinhala demands, and too moderate. 
According to the LTTE, TULF members were “betrayers” and their habit of talking about an 
independent homeland and then going to the capital for talks with the Sri Lankan government 
was “ineffective and opportunistic.”186 
The previously English-educated Tamil elites were replaced by radical youth informed by 
the Marxist politics of the 1970s-- and it was ineffective government policy that acted as a 
radicalizing force.
187
  Perhaps the most interesting difference between the formally recognized 
Tamil political parties and the LTTE were the profiles of participants of each group. Unlike 
higher-caste participants of the TULF, LTTE youth were lower middle-class from lower caste 
backgrounds who felt that their interests were not represented by elected politicians.
188
 However, 
both elites and lower-caste Tamil militants agreed, as one LTTE member stated, that there was 
“no democracy in the North and East [of Sri Lanka],” areas of Sri Lanka that were Tamil 
dominated. The allegedly democratic Sri Lankan government benefited only the Sinhalese. 
189
 
In his book War and Peace: Armed Struggle and Peace Efforts of Liberation Tigers, 
Anton Balasingham argued that the militant groups of the 1980s were popular because they had 
become a space for resisting the Sinhalese state. He wrote that traditional Tamil political actors 
could not offer concrete political venues for youth participation.
190
 Tamil youth shared the belief 
that the LTTE worked on their behalf. In a study on Tamil youth and their perceptions of the 
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LTTE, Catherine Brun found that Balasingham’s statement was representative of how many 
youth (males and females) felt. One young man told her that, “they [LTTE] are working with a 
lot of devotion and commitment on behalf of the Tamil race.”191  
While Prabhakaran and the early members of the LTTE felt that non-violent protest was 
ineffective, press releases (a form of peaceful political communication) used to convince Tamil 
civilians to enlist were written carefully to characterize the conflict on ethnic lines. The men who 
initially joined the LTTE were not coerced, but persuaded by the LTTE’s Central Committee. 
The Central Committee, responsible for creating policy, was a twelve-person group dominated 
by men until the destruction of the LTTE, though female participation was more prominent 
during the LTTE’s later years (Thamilini, the leader of the Women’s Military Wing said there 
were five women on the committee as of 2006 and stated that because women were newer to the 
organization, their political influence was not as prominent in the early years of the organization 
but grew as time passed.
192) The Central Committee often justified the LTTE’s violence by 
referring to the Sri Lankan government and the SLDF as “entrenched oppressor forces” and 
speaking explicitly of “Sinhalese oppression.”193  
These statements were persuasive because state atrocities against the Tamil people were 
far-reaching and systematic. Black July, for example, was referred to by the LTTE as a 
“holocaust…[that]…united all sections of the Tamil masses.”194 A Black Tiger, in a statement he 
wrote before his death, compared Tamil oppression with Jewish oppression carried out by Hitler. 
“The intensity of destruction unleashed against our people exceeds that of similar acts by Adolph 
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Hitler…I urge you to strengthen our leader’s hands, and join this inevitable last battle against our 
enemy.”195 Following trends common across multiple ethnic conflicts, Tamil communal bonds 
were reinforced when facing government persecution.  
By retaliating against an ethnic…group, the state not only creates hostility towards the 
government but also heightens awareness of a cause that may otherwise have 
remained obscure…[T]hrough their violence militant Tamils have given intellectual 
Tamils and Tamils in general a greater sense of respectability and reduce their 
perceive subordination to the Sinhalese political establishment.
196
   
 
In martial poetry written by LTTE males, references to a common Sinhalese enemy are 
common. Cadres described their enemies as “bloodthirsty Sinhala,”197 and “murderers hunting 
our nation.”198 One member, Kunan, said that as part of his training with the LTTE, an hour of 
time a day was devoted to instruction that explained how the Sinhalese oppressed the Tamils. It 
was through this knowledge that he acquired the anger to fight his enemies, something he later 
regretted.
199
  
As a result of constant government persecution, there was almost unanimous support for 
the LTTE amongst male interviewees, and many stated that if the army came again they would 
join the Tigers and subsequently die. They had no illusions about combat or growing up in a 
conflict zone.  One male youth reported that if the army attacked again he would join the LTTE, 
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and if it did not he would complete his education.
200
  Another stated that the Sri Lankan army 
routinely entered people’s homes and demanded to know if any of the family members were 
Tigers; he had been beaten severely, taken to a labour camp, and later released. “All Tamil 
people are affected by the war. At the checkpoints they check our ID cards, they check our 
clothes and parcels, and so forth. They ask if we are Tigers.”201   
Violent riots like Black July reinforced ethnic difference. Since its beginnings, the LTTE 
had been speaking of discrimination and the July massacre only reinforced the truth of these 
claims. While, prior to Black July, Tamils had been content to live in Colombo, the massacre and 
post-massacre environment left the Colombo Tamil community obliterated, creating unease 
amongst the survivors and only increasing youth militancy. One fighter who had joined as a 
result of the 1983 massacre stated that “[l]arge numbers of Tamil men, mostly teenagers, reacted 
to what they saw as the Sri Lankan government’s indiscriminate persecution of innocent Tamils 
and joined the insurgency, which was rapidly gathering support.”202  
The LTTE also used the riots to highlight ethnic differences and persuade Tamil males to 
join the organization. One recruit mentioned that the LTTE had approached him (he used the 
word “pestered”) and convinced him to join by arguing that everyone had to make a sacrifice. 
“[T]hey had been telling me about all the terrible things that have happened to our people and 
how bad the Sinhala people are.”203 The LTTE political wing would routinely urge students and 
former cadres to join (or join again, for those who had left the organization) and to fulfill, as one 
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press release stated, their “duty…to the motherland.”204  These recruitment drives occurred in 
schools and many male school-aged youth joined voluntarily after hearing speeches by Tamil 
Tigers.
205
  
From an early age we have been told that the Sinhalese people are not good. [The] 
LTTE produce films, ballads and street dramas to recruit the soldiers. They  
would say: Sinhalese did this, they did that, you can join us. They came to schools 
and tuition centers.
206
 
 
Other male cadres corroborated this story and added that the LTTE would lecture 
students on how the Sinhalese were “devils” and how they “trampled” the Tamils.207 “When I 
think of my time with the LTTE, the situation was such that I thought I was doing the right thing. 
There was so much excitement and intensity of purpose. Why? Because we constantly heard how 
bad the Sinhalese were and how bad the government was.”208 
It was not only the language used by the LTTE that reinforced ethnic differences, but the 
language used by the Sri Lankan government after the Black July massacre. When addressing Sri 
Lankan citizens, government officials addressed the Sinhalese and not the Tamil victims of 
violence. There was, in general, no acknowledgement of Tamil suffering. Instead, government 
spokespeople pointed to how the violence had inconvenienced and harmed the Sinhalese.
209
 In an 
address to the nation, the Sri Lankan president addressed Black July’s aftermath by stating that, 
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“that Sinhalese will never agree to the division of the country which has been a united nation for 
2,500 years.”210 The Prime Minister excused Sinhalese behaviour and made their violence 
acceptable when he stated, “[w]e see that our people who have been misled by such rumours are 
enraged and frightened. As a result they have been led to violent acts.”211 The government’s 
response to the riots ensured that the LTTE could use Black July as an effective recruitment tool. 
Further reinforcing ethnic separation was the make-up of the Sri Lankan army. Tamil 
men formed 40% of the armed forces in 1956 and were reduced to 1% by 1970.
212
 The armed 
forces were overwhelmingly Sinhalese and firm believers in “hegemonistic ideologies that 
succeeding administrations had espoused. They went into the campaign, not as a professional 
army fighting a war on behalf of a supracommunal state, but as an army asserting the interests of 
the Sinhalese against Tamils.”213  
Both the Tamil militants and the SLDF were comprised of youth from lower middle-class 
backgrounds. However, while Tamil youth were denied access to university and language 
recognition, the Sri Lankan government had recruited rural middle class Sinhalese youth into the 
army as a way of widening their employment opportunities.
214
  The State used Sinhala 
nationalism when communal tensions arose to justify educational and employment policies that 
favoured the Sinhalese.
215
 Tamil and Sinhalese youth were almost identical in profile save for 
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their ethnic backgrounds, and one group was benefiting from government policy while the other 
was facing its selective ramifications.  The profile of the Sri Lankan army provided further 
evidence that the government only served the Sinhalese. Not until the conflict ended in May 
2009 did the Sri Lankan government consciously integrate Tamil males into the armed forces
216
 
and create job opportunities for Tamil youth and ex-combatants by holding job fairs.
217
 
Opportunity was divided on ethnic lines. Tamil males were deprived of the opportunity to seek 
financial stability because of their ethnic background, something that will be further explored in 
the following section of this chapter.  
The success and growth of the LTTE was a consequence of the government’s failure to 
integrate Tamils into the democratic process and provide them with the benefits of social 
programming afforded to the Sinhalese. Black July accentuated Sri Lankan’s institutional 
breakdown and was especially apparent when the Sinhala--dominated security personnel 
inflamed the mob’s aggression. While race riots against Tamils had been occurring since the 
1950s, security personnel never aided or abetted the rioters. Their discipline and impartiality 
even earned them a high reputation amongst northern Tamils, the group that had been most 
affected by violent conflict. “Such perceptions of impartiality and professionalism had 
disappeared by the 1960s when the police and army came to be viewed as part of the Sinhalese 
vanguard designed to subjugate the Tamils.”218  
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While the LTTE’s press releases reiterated that the conflict was a result of ethno-cultural 
discrimination, in practice ethnic discrimination meant depriving Tamil youth of access to 
education, employment, and non-violent lives. The organization spoke of ethno-cultural 
divisions because they were part of the reason Tamil males chose to fight back against the Sri 
Lankan state. The organization believed that these appeals were persuasive or else it would not 
have used them in an effort to recruit members. While male LTTE members spoke of ethnic 
discrimination to their interviewers, they were also likely to mention how their rights had been 
contravened. The factors that resulted in feelings of ethnic alienation, and subsequently 
reinforced ethno-cultural identity, were based on elements of human security. 
Security 
Tamil men have been affected by the war differently than women. They formed the majority of 
casualties in the civil conflict and were more likely than women to leave war-affected areas 
(whether to go abroad or to Colombo) in search for employment as the war affected the 
employment prospects of Tamil men.
219
 Conflict-affected areas, mostly in the north and east of 
Sri Lanka, had high rates of unemployment and low levels of economic activity.
220
 As one Tamil 
Internally Displaced Person (IDP) said, “you know, we are women and therefore used to being 
nobody. This is why we can cope better than the men.”221 Joke Schrijvers goes as far as to say 
that “in terms of status and self-esteem men have lost more than women.”222 
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Common themes found in interviews with male militants were the deaths of loved ones, 
the physical insecurity of their environment, and the lack of educational and employment 
prospects as reasons for joining the LTTE. Subsequently, interviewers who spoke with male 
LTTE youth routinely found that their commitment to an independent Tamil Eelam was sincere, 
but that most of them also had, to paraphrase Trawick, other aspirations related to leading a life 
absent of war.
223
  
Educational and Employment Disruption 
The previous section on women highlighted how the LTTE provided additional training and 
employment opportunities for those with minimal alternatives. Interviews and NGO reports 
indicate that male LTTE members were more likely than females to cite joining the organization 
for employment opportunities. In fact, lack of employment prospects figured prominently as 
reason for joining the LTTE and was often cited as frequently as the loss of a family member.  
Of these reasons, it was educational disruption and lack of legal rights that caused 
Prabhakaran to form the TNT in 1972 (which was later renamed the LTTE in 1976.) Before the 
Standardization policy was implemented, the average Tamil believed that ethnic alienation could 
be overcome peacefully.
224
 From the moment Standardization was implemented in 1973, 
students would stage protests whenever ministers visited Tamil-dominated areas like Jaffna, 
vandalize town walls with anti-government slogans, and stone government buses and property, 
occasionally torching them.
225
  
                                                 
223
 Trawick, Enemy Lines, 185. 
224
 Swamy, Tigers of Lanka, 25. 
225
 Ibid, 26. 
73 
 
The Standardization admission policy hindered economic mobility for Tamils by limiting 
their access to higher education.
226
 Further decreasing economic mobility and chances for 
employment was the “Sinhala only” policy, which ensured that speakers who spoke only Tamil 
became professionally illiterate overnight.
227
 Following the end of the conflict, the Sri Lankan 
government created a commission designed to re-habilitate LTTE fighters. The Commissioner 
General found that most LTTE fighters believed that problems with the country lay in class 
distinction and the lack of economic opportunity given to Tamil youth.
228
 
Both Standardization and the “Sinhala Only” policies were divided on ethno-cultural 
lines, causing young Tamil youth to have their livelihoods and abilities to pursue employment 
and education compromised. “We…thought it was natural to join the LTTE since there were no 
standard jobs on offer; my brothers have done the same, and so have most others.”229 While the 
war provided much needed income to poor rural Sinhalese with limited opportunities, it stifled 
development in war-affected areas. 
230
 In her interviews, Brun found that young people joined or 
considered joining the LTTE during times of adversity. When alternatives were scarce, when 
there was not enough food or studying became too hard, the LTTE became the most attractive 
option.
231
 Human Rights Watch also corroborated Brun’s conclusions and agreed that many 
                                                 
226
 Amita Shastri, “The Material Basis for Separation: The Tamil Eelam Movement in Sri Lanka,” The Journal of 
Asian Studies, 49 (2001): 1. 
227
 Ibid, 212. 
228
 Dinouk Colombage, “Ex-LTTE Rebels Warned,” The Sunday Leader, June 11, 2012, accessed February 7, 2012, 
http://www.thesundayleader.lk/2012/01/15/ex-ltte-rebels-warned/.  
229
 Brett and Specht, Young Soldiers, 22. 
230
 Camilla Orjuela, “The Bullet in the Living Room: Linking Security and Development in a Colombo 
Neighborhood,” Security Dialogue 41 (2010): 1. 
231
 Brun, “Birds of Freedom.”  
74 
 
young people joined due to reasons relating to poverty.
232
 One cadre, who called himself “S,” 
described how he was forced to stop his education and then went to the LTTE in search of 
employment.  
I wanted to do a job because of my security. One day my friends told me that there 
were some vacancies in a garage that the LTTE vehicles were repaired…I worked 
there about one year…I joined them because my brothers could study further and my 
family can live happily. For all these [reasons], I worked for them.
233
 
 
Educational and employment disruption caused by the war exacerbated the serious 
economic problem faced by Tamils. No alternative had been left for poor Tamils other than to 
turn to the LTTE.
234
 One militant, Sabesan, stated that he “faced terrible problems because of the 
war. If not for the war we would have lived happily. My family and most of the village suffered 
badly due to the economical problems. At the time it was very difficult to earn money. We 
suffered a lot due to this.”235 Another militant stated that as a result of the poor economic climate 
he was struggling to “earn a little money, to exist,” but then the Sri Lankan army detained him 
and many other male Tamils in labour camps.
236
  
I worked for them without money, then I cannot earn anything for my family…[W]hat 
wrong had I done? Only thing was we were Tamil and young. Many of the men and 
young boys like me had to go…We felt helpless because there was no one to turn to 
for justice and relief…I had to be free, so I decided to join the LTTE who were 
fighting against this type of situation.
237
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Employment searches and school operations continued in spite of the war. Universities 
and other public institutions expected students and employees to attend class and work regularly, 
causing stressful challenges to those already suffering the consequences of living in a war 
zone.
238
  When thousands of Tamil students were preparing for their government scheduled A-
Level exams in August, war broke out in June and the Sri Lankan government announced that 
the exams would not be rescheduled. Not until the LTTE took advantage and used the situation 
as a successful recruitment tool did the Sri Lankan government offer other exam centres 
unaffected by war as an alternative.
239
   
While women mentioned educational disruption as a reason for joining the LTTE, Black 
July, a time of high physical insecurity, drove them to join the organization. The men and boys 
who formed the LTTE first joined in response to government policies that denied them access to 
education and employment. The differences between sexes may stem from traditional Tamil 
culture that emphasizes the male as breadwinner and family provider.
240
 By looking at statements 
made by “S” and those who had been detained in labour camps, there is some evidence that 
males in the LTTE felt they had a responsibility to provide financially for their immediate 
relatives.  
These traditional Tamil concepts, however, evolved as a result of the conflict. War 
created opportunities for women to redefine their labour.
241
 Men faced with war, however, were 
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likely to lose their responsibility, employment, and property.
242
 By 1980, a conservative estimate 
placed unemployment for Tamil youth with Advanced Level or Ordinary Level qualifications at 
forty percent.
243
  
 According to Newton Gunasinghe, a Sri Lankan sociologist and Tamil rights activist, 
male Tamils usually relied on the public sector for employment, but the discriminatory 
admissions procedures for universities and government jobs forced many of them to seek work 
outside Tamil dominated areas or to stay and organize protests.
244
 Further, the neoliberal 
economic policies adopted by the Sri Lankan government flooded the market with cheap 
agricultural goods and ruined the Jaffna middle class and peasantry, one of the most productive 
sectors of the Sri Lankan agricultural industry.
245
  
Physical Insecurity 
Though poor education and economic prospects were what prompted student anger and propelled 
males to militancy, the level of physical insecurity that steadily increased over the duration of the 
war also motivated males to join the LTTE. The government response to militancy was to 
perceive Tamil males as terrorist threats that required a military response instead of a response 
that addressed the underlying causes of their protests.
246
 This created further physical insecurity 
for Tamil men and only provided greater motivation for them to join the LTTE.  
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The Sri Lankan government implemented emergency rule from 1983 to 2001, and again 
in 2005. Human rights violations, including unlawful killings and torture, have not been legally 
addressed, even though provisions for accountability are constitutionally required.
247
 Males, in 
particular, were especially vulnerable. As Tamizh Kavi, Prabhakaran’s speech writer stated, 
“[d]uring the war, Tamil men could not venture out to army controlled areas because the army 
would arrest them on some pretext. Many civilians were killed in custody.”248  Male interviewees 
have also mentioned that even during ceasefires they had to restrict their movements because, as 
males, they were more likely suspected to be LTTE militants.
249
 The 1979 Prevention of 
Terrorism Act dictated the laws governing emergency rule and allowed security forces to arrest 
and detain a suspected militant for 18 months without charge. The act was applied retroactively 
and resulted in the widespread torture and human rights abuses of Tamil youth.
250
 Women 
reported witnessing their husbands being pulled into white vans, “the archetypal vehicle of 
abduction in Sri Lanka,” in full view of nearby army checkpoints.251  Kavi explained that 
because men became security targets and had to restrict their movements, new opportunities 
arose for women to travel for work and business--and to become militants.
252
  
 In interviews conducted by Rachel Brett and Irma Specht, males reported that they 
understood the risk of being captured by Sri Lankan armed forces and joined the LTTE to protect 
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themselves from violent physical threats. For example, one male youth stated that “[t]he risk of 
being taken by the army was bigger as we grew older, and when we joined the LTTE, we had 
guns to protect ourselves and other Tigers to protect us.”253  The risks of torture under detention 
were well known to male militants and the threat of pain induced many militants to carry cyanide 
capsules, even before it became mandatory within the organization.
254
  
 Because the LTTE controlled significant territory in northern Sri Lanka, aerial bombing 
in Jaffna was preferred to sending in ground troops. Subsequently, the civilian population, 
instead of the LTTE, became the primary victims of its aerial bombing campaigns.
255
 In addition 
to the increase in violence, the Sri Lankan government imposed economic sanctions that were 
also mainly felt by the civilian population. 
256
 Nearing the end of the war, the Sri Lanka 
government expelled aid organizations from LTTE-controlled territory, resulting in severe 
scarcity of food, fuel and medicines. One LTTE spokesman alleged that the Sri Lankan 
government was trying to starve the population. 
257
  
The majority of interviewees stated that, because the Sri Lankan government chose aerial 
bombing as a military tactic on Tamil dominated areas, they were personally affected by the war 
and they knew someone who had been killed by the SLDF. While the LTTE has a poor human 
rights record (the organization has been accused of recruiting children and attempting to 
ethnically cleanse Muslim Tamils from northern and Eastern Sri Lanka) they managed to provide 
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their own constituents with some protections. 
258
 Many male Tamils stated that the SLDF 
murdered their siblings and friends 
259
 and while some joined because of its revolutionary ideals, 
others joined because they felt safer as members of the LTTE than as unprotected civilians. 
There were two reasons for this feeling of safety. First, young males felt stronger knowing they 
could fight back (even though they were well aware they could die.) Secondly, the LTTE knew 
in advance when the SLDF would attack and managed to evacuate most of its members to the 
jungles where they would remain unharmed.
260
 Joining the Tigers became a safer option than 
remaining a civilian. Kunan stated that he joined the LTTE during the IPKF’s mission in Sri 
Lankan. “They [IPKF soldiers] used to trouble me when I walked along the streets. I wanted 
protection so I joined the movement. I worked for the movement for many years, and enjoyed the 
power, the dignity, and the protection.”261 Another member reported that he joined the LTTE in 
1991 because there were frequent roundups and arrests of innocent people in his village, which 
subsequently lead him to becoming a long-term LTTE member.
262
 
Moreover, Tamils had more reason to trust the LTTE than the SLDF: the LTTE did not 
randomly attack and kill Tamil civilians.
263
 Further, as another interviewee stated, the presence 
of the LTTE deterred SLDF military attacks. “Now the army won’t come. The LTTE are here, 
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after all.”264 Unlike the Sinhala-dominated armed forces, the LTTE provided protection for 
Tamil civilians.  Though the Sri Lankan government claimed it was pursuing a policy of zero 
civilian casualties, a UN independent commission on the conflict found that the SLDF 
intentionally shelled ‘No Fire Zones,’ the United Nations Hub, in close proximity to the 
International Committee for the Red Cross, and hospitals on the front lines.
265
 The LTTE was 
simply more credible. One Tamil rights activist stated that instead of venturing into ‘No Fire 
Zones’ the Tamil people preferred to flee into the Jungle with the LTTE, leaving ghost towns 
behind. “The SLA (Sri Lankan Army) has a long and recorded history of killing Tamils so 
people do not trust them…”266  
Consequently, both women and men were prone to citing the loss of a friend or family 
member as a reason for joining the LTTE. Most LTTE members knew someone close who had 
died, and an ethnographic study conducted by Trawick reported that civilians who were 
considering joining the LTTE also experienced personal loss. One young man stated that he 
joined because his father was killed by the SLDF when he was two years old. His brother was 
also killed in the LTTE’s service, a death he described as heroic.267 Another man cited revenge 
for his uncle’s death as a reason for joining the LTTE. For him, it was a matter of “family honor 
to take revenge.” 268 Brun corroborates this finding by indicating that many of the young Tamil 
men she interviewed joined or contemplated joining in order to avenge the death of a loved one. 
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Many who joined also knew friends who were involved in the organization,
269
 indicating that the 
likelihood of joining the organization was sometimes linked to a personal connection.
270
  
 Male interviewees were more likely to cite personal violations they had experienced, 
whereas females were more likely to cite violations of others with whom they had relationships; 
as already demonstrated, no LTTE woman admitted to being sexually assaulted, but instead cited 
cases affecting the community. In an interview with numerous students (some who were 
considering joining the LTTE and others who had already joined) in conflict-affected eastern Sri 
Lanka, Trawick notes that personal humiliation was one of several prominent reasons why young 
men chose to join the Tigers.
271
  
 Security and ethno-cultural identity are deeply intertwined. Research demonstrates that 
minority groups perceive security threats differently than majorities.
272
 Members of ethnic 
groups will say “we need security” and therefore require that “we” be defined, usually in contrast 
to another more dominant group. Security for one group requires establishing boundaries.
273
 In 
the case of ethnic conflicts, the boundaries are defined on the basis of ethno-cultural 
distinctiveness. Consequently, men who experienced a loss of security understood that this loss 
was based on their problematized ethnicity.   
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Sexual Assault 
Though men are expected to retain a veneer of invulnerability, the fact remains that men faced 
violence during war that took aim at their masculinity. Hegemonic masculinity does not only 
seek to control women, but also seeks to control subordinate masculinities. 
274
  
The thesis has already discussed Tamil women and their experiences with sexual assault. 
Women were inclined, in part, to join the LTTE because of the anger they felt towards the SLDF. 
Sexual assault directed against Tamil women has been extensively documented. However, 
women were not the only victims of sexual assault in the Sri Lankan civil war. Male sexual 
violence, overwhelmingly perpetrated by men against other men, was systemically employed 
during wartime. In one study conducted by a British torture treatment centre, twenty-one percent 
of Tamil males reported sexual torture while in detention. 
275
 Tamil males in detention had their 
testicles trampled, kicked, and slammed in drawers.
276
   
 In one particular case, a group of Tamil women and men were held in an unauthorized 
detention centre and, upon learning that the LTTE had killed three Sinhala soldiers, the soldiers 
began beating the detainees and then forced the men to watch as they pinched and twisted the 
women’s nipples with pliers. The same pliers were used to squeeze the genitals of the male 
detainees.
277
  “Women’s bodies can be seen as vehicles through which the nation or group can be 
reproduced…raping women…is a key weapon in the humiliation of opposing forces.”278 Forcing 
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Tamil men to watch the sexual assault of Tamil women was an act specifically designed to hurt 
and humiliate the male detainees while physically harming and humiliating the women involved 
In another study, academics interviewing 23 male Tamils found that the majority of 
respondents had personal experience with sexual assault. Only two respondents refused to 
answer the questions. Eight men reported that they had witnessed sexual assault; four men 
reported that they had experienced it; three men stated they had both experienced and witnessed 
sexual assault. Only six men responded that they had not witnessed or experienced sexual 
assault.
279
   
Despite these documented cases, men did not cite their personal experiences with sexual 
assault as a reason for joining the LTTE.
280
 Instead, LTTE spokesmen would highlight how 
women and girls were targeted with sexual assault. As one spokesman stated, when speaking of 
Tamils sympathetic to the Sri Lankan government, “[i]f you are born in our ethnic group and 
then destroy our ethnicity by consorting with outsiders, you commit treason and cannot call 
yourself a Tamil anymore. Because of that our girls are assaulted and killed.”281 Another 
prominent member (Colonel Karuna, who later defected and provided information to the Sri 
Lankan government) argued that he and the LTTE regretted the assassination of Rajiv Ghandi, 
but that Ghandi’s assassination was partially in response to the Indian Peacekeeping Forces 
raping Tamil women.
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 Atrocities against females were highlighted and used as leverage to 
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humiliate the Sinhalese and Tamil defectors, possibly following war-time trend of politicizing 
female bodies for personal gain. Sexual assault against men was not highlighted or mentioned by 
LTTE leadership.  
While sexual assault is often characterized as occurring due to male-female power 
relations that seek to subordinate all women, wartime sexual violence is even more complicated 
because of its intersection with ethnicity. Sexual assault during wartime is not indiscriminate and 
is committed against targeted men and women, specifically “enemy” men and “enemy” 
women.
283
 LTTE males attempted to subordinate Sinhala masculinity by characterizing Sinhala 
men as oversexed and felt the need to leverage attacks against girls and women as a reason for 
protecting the Tamil nation.
284
  By doing so they symbolically linked the female body to the 
integrity of the community and nation. Sri Lankan authorities specifically targeted Tamil men 
because of their subordinated ethnic status.  
Rather than being received as a homosexual (thus less masculine) act, male to male 
rape is a highly masculinised act for the perpetrator and his audience, whilst the victim 
is feminised. This reflects the construction of female sexuality as passive and male 
sexuality as active. In wartime, then, male to male rape (as male to female rape) 
humiliates and feminises the victim whilst asserting the perpetrator’s dominant 
(heterosexual, ethno-national) masculinity. The ethnonational element means that 
symbolically the victim’s national identity is also feminised and humiliated.285  
 
There are many potential reasons why males did not report sexual assault during wartime, or why 
LTTE males did not identify their gender-induced insecurity as a reason for joining the 
organization. The Refugee Law project, an NGO that deals with male sexual assault victims, 
states that while female rape is severely under-reported, male rape is almost never reported. Men 
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are afraid to confess because, as men, they are expected to be invulnerable and fear losing 
support and comfort from those around them.
286
 Male sexual assault, in general, is severely 
under-researched. In one study conducted, over 4,076 NGOs that researched wartime sexual 
violence were analyzed, but only three percent of these organizations mentioned the experiences 
of men in their literature.
287
  
 Following this pattern, while the LTTE was willing to speak directly about sexual 
violence that affected women, they remained silent on the sexual assault of Tamil men. 
Similarly, no interviews conducted with Tamil men mentioned their anger with the sexual assault 
and emasculation of Tamil males as a reason for joining the LTTE, even though these cases were 
methodically documented and relayed to interviewers by male survivors.  Male interviewees did 
not include sexual assault when they spoke of the physical insecurity caused by the presence of 
the SLDF.   
Consequently, Sri Lanka’s weak government policy and its failure to successfully 
manage its multi-ethnic identity created material conditions that prevented Tamil males from 
accessing education and employment opportunities––vital components of human security. In 
response, Tamil males joined the LTTE and engaged in militant acts, causing the Sri Lankan 
government, in turn, to retaliate violently. The Sri Lankan military response, which included the 
racial and gender profiling of Tamil men, caused more Tamil males to join because their physical 
security was further compromised. Men were more likely to understand their marginalized status 
within the country along ethno-cultural lines instead of as resulting from their gender, even 
though they were targeted differently because they were male. The LTTE leadership used ethnic 
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oppression as a framework to justify violence, speaking in general terms about violence against 
Tamils, while lower-ranking LTTE men found these appeals convincing because of their 
personal experiences and deprived ambitions, the experiences of their relatives, and encounters 
with Sri Lankan forces. 
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION 
This thesis shows that males and females joined the LTTE for reasons relating to security and 
identity. However, women and men explained these reasons differently and partially in response 
to their gendered experiences and cultural expectations. When males first joined the LTTE in 
1972-1976, they did so because their access to education and employment was compromised. 
When females joined after the 1983 riots, they did so in a time of heightened physical risk for the 
Tamil minority. Thus, when males and females first joined the LTTE they conceptualized 
security differently, though their reasons overlapped during the organization’s later years: males 
began citing threats of bodily harm after the implementation of the 1979 Prevention of Terrorism 
Act and the 1983 riots.  
 Women spoke of their gender and the LTTE’s commitment to gender equality as a reason 
for joining the organization. Women were also aware of their ethno-cultural identity and of how 
the Sri Lankan government used ethnicity to justify its policies. Similarly, men understood their 
lack of opportunity as stemming from their Tamil identity. However, unlike females, males did 
not cite gender as a reason for joining the LTTE, even though they experienced harm differently 
and gender expectations were clearly relevant. 
 The LTTE was a male-only organization until 1983. Until then, the LTTE protested 
against what they viewed as unjust educational and language policies directed towards Tamils. 
These educational and language policies prevented males from securing stable employment and 
post-secondary education. For Tamil males, who were traditionally expected to be the main 
income earner in the household, the lack of access to financial security was especially frustrating.  
In 1974 men began joining the LTTE hoping to reclaim these rights and because they perceived 
non-violent political protest as ineffective.  
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 The SLDF targeted male Tamils precisely because they assumed that males would be 
more likely to participate in militant acts. The outcome of this policy meant male Tamils 
comprised the majority of deaths, disappearances, and tortures. Males interviewed by the 
academics and journalists cited in this thesis spoke negatively of their own experiences with the 
SLDF during this time. These brutal encounters were partially responsible for their decision to 
join the LTTE. These statements may be contrasted with statements given by women, who often 
spoke of their families and communities, but did not mention personal encounters with the 
SLDF.   
Males spoke of themselves often, in addition to talking about the pain suffered by their 
relatives and friends. They were also more likely than women to chronicle their own 
humiliations with the Sri Lankan forces.  The LTTE male elites first outlined the conflict in 
ethno-cultural terms to justify their violence, in language that was supported by lower-ranking 
male members. However, male members were unlikely to join the organization simply because 
they felt it was their duty to engage in self-sacrifice. They participated in violence because of 
their poor financial prospects and because they sought physical security. In fact, the maravar 
designation, the ideal fighter stemming from Tamil folklore and idealized by Prabhakaran, was 
emulated more by female LTTE members. Why men were more willing to speak of themselves 
and women more likely to speak of their communities requires further research. 
Even though Tamil males were violently targeted because they were male and Tamil, in 
interviews with various sources men omitted discussing gender as a reason for joining the LTTE. 
Though sexual assaults against Tamil males were documented by NGOs, they are not discussed 
by Tamil men. However, Tamil male civilians were systematically sexually assaulted. While the 
LTTE spoke of and was willing to issue public statements about the sexual assault directed at 
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Tamil civilian women, the organization was silent about the threat of sexual assault faced by 
civilian men. Why the LTTE was silent needs to be further researched. The LTTE did not 
publicize sexual abuse committed against Tamil men to humiliate the Sri Lankan forces, 
something it routinely did with sexual assault faced by women. The LTTE, possibly, conflated 
gender with women and did not address the gendered ways men lived their lives, even though the 
conflict demonstrably affected men and women differently.  
 Instead of speaking about their lives through a gendered lens, men understood their 
deprived rights as stemming from ethno-cultural inequality. While the LTTE leadership spoke of 
racial inequality in intellectual and philosophical terms, a requirement when speaking for a large 
organization with a varied membership, lower-ranking males understood that the loss of their 
families, their own degrading encounters with the Sri Lankan forces, and lack of education and 
employment opportunities were a result of the Sri Lankan government associating criminality 
with Tamil ethnicity. 
 Women joined later than men, at a time when Tamils were being physically targeted and 
attacked by the SLDF and Sri Lankan police. Women were participants in other more socialist 
Tamil militant groups, but did not ask to join the LTTE until after the 1983 riots left hundreds, or 
perhaps thousands (the numbers are still unconfirmed), of Tamil civilians dead. While women in 
other militant groups may have conceptualized security differently, this thesis indicates that 
female LTTE members joined because of heightened risks to bodily integrity, the experience of 
being displaced due to war, and because they witnessed the effects of violence on their 
communities. Unlike men, women were less likely to speak of their own encounters with the 
SLDF and/or at checkpoints and instead cited the experiences of their families and friends. The 
majority of female LTTE fighters had experienced the loss of a friend or family member and had 
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experienced, to cite Miranda Alison, “communal suffering” even if they personally had not been 
victims of violence. The majority of LTTE female members also came predominantly from the 
north and east, the areas most affected by war. Consequently, they were witnesses to the SLDF’s 
aerial bombing campaigns and the ramifications of ethnic profiling. Even though female LTTE 
members did not mention personal encounters with the SLDF to interviewers, they mentioned 
that a climate of fear caused by indiscriminate aerial bombing and artillery shelling convinced 
them to join the LTTE. They linked the possibility of finding peace with the success of their 
community and families. When women felt the loss of security personally, it was because 
members of their family or community experienced trauma. Thus, journalistic, academic, and 
government attempts that frame women (in the LTTE, specifically) as being uncommitted to 
nationalist causes due to damaged personal psychologies are overstated and demand further 
investigation when applied to women in other militant organizations.
288
  
 The LTTE provided females with employment and training opportunities (the LTTE’s 
policewomen were paid well, for example) and as higher education is an important Tamil 
cultural concept, many women mentioned that war made studying increasingly difficult. They 
linked the inability to pursue their educations with the physical insecurity caused by war. Unlike 
males, however, most women did not mention employment as a reason for joining the 
organization. In fact, while the LTTE provided women with training advancement, those 
interviewed understood that they were actively risking their lives and recognized that 
employment with the LTTE carried the possibility of death. Females connected physical safety 
with education. If there was no war, the Tamil people could study and pursue their educations 
without disruption.  
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 Female recruits liked the LTTE’s definition of gender equality, one that construed female 
emancipation as the right to engage in combat. Many recruits felt stifled by Tamil society, but 
they also needed an avenue to defend their people once non-violent protest became ineffective. 
As LTTE members, females inhabited new roles and became extensively involved in Tamil 
political life. They seized the opportunity to create political and social agendas that affected 
Tamil civilians. The LTTE not only provided security to female recruits, but allowed them to 
become enablers of security. As LTTE members they could, for example, fight for a Tamil 
nation free from threats to education and employment. They could also defend Tamil women 
from sexual assault––which, according to interviewees, created a climate of fear and highlighted 
female vulnerability to gendered attacks by the SLDF.  Unlike males, females spoke of the threat 
of sexual assault, though no female member admitted to being a survivor. Instead, they wove the 
threat of sexual assault into a larger narrative about protecting Tamil women from Sri Lankan 
aggressors. 
Related to the opportunity of providing their families and communities  with security, 
women also spoke of the self-fulfillment coming from being an active community member. 
Many recruits believed that Tamil culture had hindered females and that the LTTE had allowed 
women to reach their potential by disproving that women were weak. This belief contrasts with 
statements made by male recruits, who often spoke of their involvement as a last resort or as 
something they had to do for survival. Security, as conceptualized by females, meant achieving 
equality with men, including the Tamil men who were their allies. The war created opportunities 
to expand female responsibility, partially because the male population was being decimated and 
the LTTE needed more members. As the male population decreased and as Tamil men left war-
affected areas in search of employment, women often became the dominant income-earners of 
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their families and were required to work outside the home. While some Tamil women must have 
found this situation difficult, LTTE females spoke of these new roles positively to their 
interviewers.   
 However, females joined not only because they were attracted to the LTTE’s 
understanding of gender emancipation. Black July reinforced ethno-cultural oppression against 
Tamils. Tamil civilians were violently targeted specifically because of their ethnic identity, and 
women were targeted specifically because they were Tamil women. Aerial bombing and artillery 
shelling were targeted at Tamils.  Enemy lines were drawn around ethnic differentiation.  
 Though males and females joined the LTTE for different reasons, with females believing 
that gender equality and physical safety were paramount (freedom from fear) and males first 
joined because they needed access to education and employment to survive (freedom from want), 
both sexes were led to the LTTE because of Sri Lanka’s institutional decay. Linguistic and 
educational policies were created to benefit the Sinhalese, historically underrepresented in the 
government sector and certain post-secondary departments.  Sri Lanka could not manage its 
ethnic differences and interpreted democracy to mean majoritarian rule. No protections were 
guaranteed for its largest minority. Non-violent protests against oppressive linguistic and 
educational policies were ineffective, and so youth turned to militancy. After the 1983 riots, the 
Sri Lankan government banned political parties from calling for a separate state, an action which 
increased ethnic polarization on the island and denied Tamil activists the ability to protest 
peacefully. In short, the Tamils perceived the Sri Lankan government to be a Sinhalese 
government.  
Often when studying cases involving security issues, academics will determine who 
benefits from the state’s security arrangement. In the case of the Sri Lankan civil conflict, 
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security was provided for the Sinhalese so that they would be protected from the marginalized 
and criminalized Tamil population. The Sri Lankan government, working to reconcile historic 
Sinhalese marginalization, constructed policies that protected the majority from a problematized 
Tamil minority. Both sexes viewed the Sri Lankan government as oppressive and designed only 
to protect the Sinhalese. The loss of the government’s ability to protect all ethnic groups within 
its borders served to reinforce the LTTE’s claim; the organization was the sole and legitimate 
representative of the Tamil people. 
  While males and females had different perspectives on security and identity, there was 
some overlap. Both sexes sought security and joined the LTTE under the (correct) perception 
that the organization would provide education and employment, even if these provisions would 
come in a future ideal Tamil homeland. Where the sexes differed was that men were more likely 
than women to join the LTTE in search of employment and education, while women spoke of 
long-term security solutions that would enable Tamil youth to study.  
 Where male and female motivations were most similar was on the issue of ideology. 
Lower-ranking males and females were not attracted to the organization’s ideological 
commitments to Marxist-Leninism. Despite the organization’s prominent socialist members 
(including Prabhakaran, Adele Ann and Anton Balasingham), the LTTE rarely use socialist 
appeals as a recruitment tool. Women were more responsive to nationalist and feminist appeals 
and men were motivated to join the LTTE due to poor material conditions that prevented them 
from gaining access to education and employment. Males did not use revolutionary socialism to 
understand these material conditions. Instead, they understood that their ethnicity was at the root 
of their marginalized status.  Similarly, females understood their reduced rights as resulting from 
the ethnic conflict and found that the LTTE offered them the opportunity to redress these 
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grievances through its commitment to gender liberation, which it defined as expanding 
traditional gender roles to include women as active combatants.  
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